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ESSAY
LIVES, LIFE-YEARS, AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
Cass R. Sunstein *
In protectingsafety, health, and the environment, government has increasingly relied on cost-benefit analysis. In undertakingcost-benefit analysis, the government has monetized risks of death through the idea of the value
of a statisticallife (VSL), currently assessed at about $6.1 million. But the
government should rely instead on the value of a statisticallife-year (VSLY),
in a way that would likely result in lower benefits calculationsfor elderly
people, and higher benefits calculationsfor children. The hard question involves not whether to undertake this shift, but how to monetize life-years, and
here willingness to pay (WTP) is generally the place not to end but to begin.
INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, numerous regulatory agencies have conducted cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of proposed rules.' To undertake this
analysis, they have had to quantify the value of a statistical life (VSL).2
Recently the range for that value has been in the neighborhood of $6.1
million. 3 But there is a conspicuous difficulty with the use of a uniform
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Matthew Adler, Carolyn Frantz,
John Graham, Robert Hahn, Lisa Heinzerling, Christine Jolls, Daniel Kahneman, Jack
Knetsch, Saul Levmore, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, David Strauss, Kimberly Thompson,
Adrian Vermeule, W. Kip Viscusi, and Scott Wallsten for helpful comments on a previous
draft. I am also grateful to participants in an extremely helpful legal theory workshop at
the University of Chicago Law School. Participants in two conferences provided valuable
help: a Brookings Institute Conference on Inequality and Happiness and an American
Enterprise Institute/Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory Studies Conference on Valuing
Life. Smita Singh provided excellent research assistance.
1. See Robert Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective 34-38 &
tbls.3-1 & 3-2 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public & Private Responsibilities for
Risk 13, 248-90 (1992) [hereinafter Viscusi, Tradeoffs].
2. See Viscusi, Tradeoffs, supra note 1, at 261-65.
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255, 2274 (2002)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic]. Several commentators have suggested that
these numbers might be too low. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price
of Nonmarket Goods, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003)
(suggesting likely current value of $12 million); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
941, 962-74 (1999) (suggesting need to inflate current figures for increases in social
wealth and in particular context of dreaded and involuntary risks); Sunstein, Arithmetic of
Arsenic, supra, at 2283-87 (discussing plausible reasons to adjust current figures upwards);
Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Changes in the Value of Life, 1940-1980, at 1-2, 11-12
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9396, 2002), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=364740 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (illustrating "importance of
rising value of life for policy evaluation"). For recent evidence that the current numbers
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VSL. Some regulatory programs benefit people who are relatively young;
others benefit people who are relatively old. If a program would prevent
fifty deaths of people who are twenty, should it be treated the same way as
a program that would prevent fifty deaths of people who are seventy?
Other things being equal, a program that protects young people seems
far better than one that protects old people, because it delivers greater
benefits. For this reason, it is sensible to think that government should
consider not simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should
concern itself also or instead with the number of life-years at stake, or the
value of statistical life-years (VSLY). At the very least, the number of sta4
tistical life-years is a more precise measure of what is involved.
At least since 1976, analysts have suggested the possibility of focusing
regulatory policy on either life-years or quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs). 5 Several agencies have experimented with this idea.6 The
problem received a great deal of public attention in connection with recent debates over VSL and VSLY within the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 7 EPA's
own assessment of the benefits of the Clean Air Act includes a calculation
of VSLY, using two estimates, $137,000 (not discounted) and $293,000
(discounted at an annual rate of five percent).8 In its "Clear Skies" proposal, EPA estimated benefits both by using the $6.1 million figure and by
using an alternative method that produced numbers of $3.7 million for
those under seventy and $2.3 million for those seventy and older. 9 The
are indeed too low, see W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a
Statistical Life, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003) [hereinafter Viscusi, Racial
Differences], finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males.
4. See, e.g., Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life,
26 Econ. Inquiry 369, 369-70 (1988) (noting that "the appropriate value of life for policy
analysis cannot be divorced from the duration of life involved since lives are extended, not
permanently saved").
5. See, e.g., Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1976, at 5, 11-15.
6. For examples, see infra Appendix.
7. For recent discussion, see Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, Is Granny Worth $2.3
Million or $6.1 Million? (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr., Policy Matters No. 03-12, May 2003), at
http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=138 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review), revised and reprinted, Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, Whose Life Is Worth More?
(And Why Is It Horrible to Ask?), Wash. Post, June 1, 2003, at B3.
8. See EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1990, app. at 1-3
(1997). For a criticism of this approach, see EPA, Children's Health Valuation Handbook
3-13 to 3-14 (Oct. 2003), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/cbd494e04
061784d85256a2b006c1945 / 6ed3736d44c87a4a85256dc1004da4ac / $ FILE / handbooklO
30.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter EPA, Children's Health],
suggesting that "the relationship between the value of risk reductions and expected
remaining life years is more complex than the simple discounted linear relationship ....
Current research does not provide a reliable method for estimating a value of a statistical
life-year." I explore this problem below.
9. See EPA, Technical Addendum: Methodologies for the Benefit Analysis of the
Clear Skies Initiative 35-37 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.airimpacts.org/docu
ments/local/Tech_adden.PDF (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter EPA,
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difference between $3.7 million and $2.3 million triggered intense criticism of a "senior death discount."' 0 Eventually EPA abandoned the idea
of varying VSL on the basis of age,I' perhaps as a result of public pressure
and after OMB found methodological problems with the study that
seemed to support the age adjustment analysis. 12 But OMB has been
strongly encouraging federal agencies, including the EPA, to consider
VSLY,13 and OMB's guidelines on cost-benefit analysis ask agencies to
"consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY."' 4 Thus OMB has
Clear Skies] (relying on M.W. Jones-Lee et al., The Value of Preventing Non-Fatal Road
Injuries: Findings of a Willingness-to-Pay National Sample Survey (Transport Research
Laboratory, Working Paper No. WP SRC2, 1993)).
10. See John Tierney, Life: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2003, § 4,
at 14.
11. Id.
12. See Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to the President's Management
Council I (May 30, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Memorandum from John Graham].
13. See id. at 1-2; Dana Wilkie, White House Continues to Push for "Age" Discounts
in Rule-Making, Copley News Service, May 16, 2003, at 1-2, available at LEXIS, News
Library, COPNWS file (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing debate over
VSLY).
14. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, at 30 (Sept.
17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Circular A-1]. More specifically, the guidelines
say:
Another way that has been used to express reductions in fatality risks is to use the
life expectancy method, the "value of statistical life-years (VSLY) extended." If a
regulation protects individuals whose average remaining life expectancy is 40
years, a risk reduction of one fatality is expressed as "40 life-years extended."
Those who favor this alternative approach emphasize that the value of a statistical
life is not a single number relevant for all situations. In particular, when there are
significant differences between the effect on life expectancy for the population
affected by a particular health risk and the populations studied in the labor
market studies, they prefer to adopt a VSLY approach to reflect those differences.
You should consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY, while
recognizing the developing state of knowledge in this area.
Longevity may be only one of a number of relevant considerations pertaining
to the rule. You should keep in mind that regulations with greater numbers of
life-years extended are not necessarily better than regulations with fewer numbers
of life-years extended. In any event, when you present estimates based on the
VSLY method, you should adopt a larger VSLY estimate for senior citizens
because senior citizens face larger overall health risks from all causes and they
may have accumulated savings to spend on their health and safety.
The valuation of fatality risk reduction is an evolving area in both results and
methodology. Hence, you should utilize valuation methods that you consider
appropriate for the regulatory circumstances. Since the literature-based VSL
estimates may not be entirely appropriate for the risk being evaluated (e.g., the
use of occupational risk premia to value reductions in risks from environmental
hazards), you should explain your selection of estimates and any adjustments of
the estimates to reflect the nature of the risk being evaluated. You should present
estimates based on alternative approaches, and if you monetize mortality risk
reduction, you should do so on a consistent basis to the extent feasible.
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urged that "agency analysts, when performing benefit-cost analysis, pre15
sent results using both the VSL and the VSLY methods."
Would use of VSLY make any difference? At first glance, a decision
to look at VSLY, as opposed to VSL, is highly likely to reduce the expected benefits of programs that mostly help older people. This was the
effect of a life-years calculation for the Clear Skies Initiative. 16 A focus on
VSLY is also likely to increase the expected benefits of programs that protect children and young people. 17 Consider a proposal, building on existing studies, to value each year of life at $273,000 for people over sixtyfive but at $172,000 for people who are younger. 18 Because the number
of remaining years is a central part of the proposed calculus, a sixty-fiveyear-old, with a life expectancy of ten more years, would be valued at $2.7
million, whereas a forty-year-old, with thirty-five years left, would be valued at $6 million. 19 Thus regulations protecting people over forty would
be worth less than they would under the $6.1 million benchmark,
whereas those protecting people under forty would be worth more. A
ten-year-old, with sixty-five years left, would be valued at over $11 million.
My simplest claim in this Essay is that in terms of welfare, it is fully
appropriate to focus on life-years, not merely lives, and that both academic and public criticisms of the life-years approach are misconceived.
The reasons for this conclusion are simple. No program literally "saves"
lives; life extension is always what is at issue. If the goal is to promote
people's welfare by lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves five
hundred life-years (and, let us say, twenty-five people) is, other things being equal, better than a regulation that saves fifty life-years (also, let us
say, twenty-five people). A program that saves younger people is better,
in this sense, than an otherwise identical program that saves older peoId.
15. Memorandum from John Graham, supra note 12, at 2. Relying on evidence that
older people show unusually high VSLY, OMB also suggests "that agencies present analyses
with larger VSLY estimates for senior citizens." Id.
16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17. The extent of the increase depends on the value of the relevant life-years and the
discount rate. Suppose that a uniform number is used for the remaining life-years of
young people. With no discount rate, or a low discount rate, a program that protects such
people will be far more valuable under VSLY than VSL. With a high discount rate, the
difference between VSLY and VSL will be compressed, but it will still result in higher
numbers for younger people.
18. See Hahn & Wallsten, supra note 7. EPA's current estimates are $172,000 for
those under age sixty-five and $434,000 for those over age sixty-five. See Memorandum
from John Graham, supra note 12, at 2 n.**. For a lifetime risk faced by someone who is
now forty, it would be sensible to calculate each life-year, before sixty-five, at the lower rate,
and to calculate each life-year, after that age, at the higher rate, subject to the appropriate
discount rate. OMB says, delicately, that "[m]ore research is needed to provide a complete
picture of how VSLY varies over the lifespan." Id.
19. I am assuming a zero percent discount rate here. As the discount rate increases,
the difference between VSL and VSLY is compressed.
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ple 2 0-a statement that seems controversial only if we see life as a snapshot in which people are frozen at their current points in the age
distribution.
Any defense of relying on life-years has to come to terms with some
equitable objections to what seems to be a form of age discrimination. 2'
A central goal here is to answer those objections. Hence I suggest not
only that more life-years mean more welfare, other things being equal,
but also that a focus on life-years does not offend ethical constraints on
the pursuit of increased welfare through regulation. 2 2 Of course it is
tempting, and in an important sense right, to urge that each life should
count for no more and no less than one. On this view, a focus on lifeyears might be seen to violate the equality principle, because it treats elderly people as if they were worth less (literally) than younger people.
This argument, I suggest, is rooted in a generally sound moral intuition:
Sometimes the pursuit of welfare should be constrained by considerations of justice. It is at least imaginable, for example, that one hundred
white people would receive more welfare from the elimination of a risk of
1/100,000 than would one hundred African Americans. But even if this
is so, government should not create an "African American death
23
discount.
The reason is that the welfare difference-assuming that it exists-is
at least partly a product of past and present injustice; making that difference salient, for purposes of policy, is itself a form of injustice. By contrast, injustice is not the source of the welfare difference between the
protection of one hundred children and the protection of one hundred
elderly people. Because every old person was once young, an emphasis
on life-years does not discriminate against anyone; the very people who
20. The "other things being equal" proviso is important here. I put to one side the
problem of transition; some older people will not have been helped by a focus on life-years
if they were young before that focus began.
21. See the overview in John McKie et al., The Allocation of Health Care Resources:
An Ethical Evaluation of the "QALY' Approach 47-71 (1998).
22. I am thus urging that, for purposes of regulatory policy, the goal is to promote
welfare, subject to justice-related constraints. It might be urged instead that here as
elsewhere, justice is part of the social maximand. I do not believe that these different
formulations lead to a different analysis of the issues I am discussing here. For a general
discussion of welfare and fairness, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare (2002). Because Kaplow and Shavell use a capacious understanding of welfare,
one that includes distributional considerations, my identification of ethical (and in a sense
fairness-related) constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation is not at odds
with their claims.
23. The issue is complex if the beneficiaries of regulation must pay all of its social
cost. Suppose, for example, that a program benefiting African Americans would also
impose costs on them, in the form of higher water bills. If so, and if the beneficiaries have
full information, a lower VSLY, for them, might be justified in principle. Government does
people no favors by requiring them to pay more than their WITP, at least if no information
failure is involved. The implication is that fully individuated WAITP, one that attempted to
capture each person's WTP, would undoubtedly result in demographic differences, and it
is far from clear that this would be unjust. For discussion, see infra Part II.C.
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lose when older also gained when younger. As I shall also show, an emphasis on life-years does not run afoul of the principles that animate the
prohibition on age discrimination. My most modest suggestion, then, is
that in producing regulatory impact analyses, with a qualitative and quantitative account of expected benefits, 24 agencies should inquire into lifeyears-and take account of that inquiry in deciding what to do.
Even if we agree that life-years matter, and should be discussed as
part of the benefits analysis, there remains the separate and quite vexing
question of how to turn them into monetary equivalents. For VSL, willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies are used to produce the relevant values. 2 5
Economists and economically-oriented lawyers urge (controversially) that
cost-benefit analysis is properly based on WTP for the various benefits of
regulation. 2 6 On this approach, the central issue is an empirical one:
whether WTP for statistical risks varies over the life cycle. If thirty-yearolds are willing to pay more (or less) to eliminate a statistical risk than
sixty-year-olds, then the difference should be reflected in cost-benefit
analyses of regulatory proposals. On this view, policymakers should use
different values for old people and young people ifand only ifWTP studies
27
show such a disparity.
If CBA is to be used at all, it is because CBA is a rough way of testing
whether a regulation will promote people's welfare, understood to mean
their actual well-being in their lives. 28 The argument for using WTP rests
24. As required by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
25. See Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2274-75 (discussing idea of
basing VSL on amount employers would have to pay to compensate employees for
increased risk of death).
26. See, e.g., Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age
and Health Status? Evidence from the United States and Canada 17-18 (Resources for the
Future, Discussion Paper No. 02-19, Apr. 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
27. See id. at 17 (examining impact of age on AIP). This view has been endorsed by
the Office of Management and Budget itself. See OMB Draft 2003 Report to Congress on
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003)
(suggesting that those who endorse VSLY assume "that the public is willing to pay more
money for a rule that saves an average of 10 life years per person than a rule that saves one
life year per person"). Of course WTP is the basis for current evaluations of regulatory
benefits. See, e.g., EPA, Clear Skies, supra note 9, at 30-38; EPA, Guidelines for Preparing
Economic Analyses 60-100 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, Guidelines]; Sunstein, Arithmetic of
Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2265-66.
28. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale
L.J. 165, 168 (1999) (arguing that "CBA . . . is consistent with every political theory that
holds that the government should care about the overall well-being of its citizens").
Throughout I use the idea of welfare in a nonsectarian sense. I do not mean to identify
the idea with the utilitarian account, and I do not mean to reduce welfare to "happiness,"
narrowly defined. As I use the term, it is agnostic on the controversial normative
questions. On utilitarianism and consequentialism, see Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and
Welfarism, 76 J. Phil. 463 (1979). For general discussion, see Amartya Sen, Development
as Freedom (1999). I believe that without resolving any difficult normative questions, it is
possible to show that statistical life-years should be taken into account, and more generally
to show that WTIP is an inadequate proxy for welfare in many circumstances. On some of
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on the view that it is, in general, an administrable way of measuring the
effects of regulation on well-being. I do not attempt to engage the complex debate over WTP fully here, or to specify the appropriate place of
WTP in regulatory policy.2 9 But I do suggest that with respect to either
lives or life-years, the argument for relying on WTP is most secure when
two conditions are met: The beneficiaries of regulation have adequate
information, and they have to pay all or almost all of the cost of regulation. When the beneficiaries of regulation lack adequate information,
the argument for making W'TP conclusive is effectively undermined, because informed choices are not being made. When the beneficiaries of
regulation do not pay its full cost, the argument for using WTP is also
weakened, because in that event, the beneficiaries, at least, might be net
gainers from the regulation even if their WTP is less than its social cost.
But these points apply to the monetization of both life-years and lives;
there is no special reason to depart from W'TP if government is focusing
on statistical life-years rather than statistical lives. My more ambitious suggestion, then, is that whenever WTP is being used as part of CBA, primary
30
attention should be paid to VSLY rather than VSL.
In principle, the choice between lives and life-years is clear and simple. It gives the appearance of difficulty only because of a kind of optical
illusion, which suggests some choice "between" older people and younger
ones. But a discussion of the underlying problems provides a window
onto a much larger and more complex set of issues. I briefly touch on
two such issues. First, economists and policymakers should not take the
WTP criterion too seriously, and they are in danger of doing precisely
that. As a measure of welfare, that criterion has several advantages, above
all in circumstances in which regulation amounts to a forced exchangerequiring people to "buy" a benefit that they may or may not find it in
their interest to buy. But in some contexts, no forced exchange is involved, because the beneficiaries of regulation do not have to pay for it.
And in some contexts, WTP is a poor proxy for welfare. In such contexts,
regulators should abandon it and think about welfare directly if they
can. 3 1 I attempt to bring recent work on people's mispredictions of the
the empirical issues involved in measuring welfare, see Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer,
Happiness and Economics 4-11 (2002); Alberto Alesina et al., Inequality and Happiness:
Are Europeans and Americans Different? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8198, Apr. 2001), available at http://dsl.nber.org/papers/w8198.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
29. For discussion of some criticisms of using WTP, see Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and
Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment 292-93 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Risk and
Reason].
30. I am supposing here that certain gaps in existing knowledge, discussed below, can
be filled. See infra Part II.
31. Of course this is a difficult task, and I offer some thoughts here only about the
easy cases. There is a burgeoning literature on the direct measurement of welfare, one
based on experience rather than WTP. For general discussion, see Daniel Kahneman, A
Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 162 (2003)
[hereinafter Kahneman, Psychological Perspective]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to
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welfare effects of their own choices to bear on that question,3 2 with the
suggestion that this work raises doubts about the use of WTP in some
situations. 33 There is a large research agenda here.
The second issue has to do with the relationship between welfare
and equity in the context of government regulation. While promoting
welfare is a basic goal of environmental regulation, there are important
ethical constraints on the pursuit of that goal. Those constraints support
some, but not all, of the moral reservations about CBA and WTP that are
stressed by their critics. 34 As I have suggested, it would generally be unac-

ceptable for government to adopt a higher VSL or VSLY for men and
whites than for women and African Americans. 35 Related problems infect the use of QALYs in certain circumstances. Suppose, for example,
that an otherwise identical government intervention could produce more
QALYs if directed at the moderately disabled than at the severely disabled; is it so clear that the intervention should therefore favor the moderately disabled? I do not believe so.
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part I discusses
the choice between life-years and lives. Here I urge that life-years are an
appropriate focus of regulatory concern. I also explore ethical and distributive constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation; I
suggest that such constraints are real and important, but that the use of
life-years does not run afoul of them. Part II turns to the vexing question
of monetization. I suggest that in general, the use of WTP does not raise
any special or distinctive conceptual issues in the context of life-years.
Unfortunately, current evidence does not provide clear findings about
how WTP, for either life-years or the remainder of life, varies over the
lifespan. Part III briefly identifies some options for policy. My most cautious suggestion here is that a life-years calculation should be part of the
overall analysis that underlies policy judgments. Part IV discusses three
extensions of the analysis: the possibility of resolving the debate over lifeBentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. Econ. 375, 379-80 (1997)
[hereinafter Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham].
32. See Kahneman, Psychological Perspective, supra note 31; George Loewenstein &
David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in Well-Being: The
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Kahneman et al., Well-Being].
33. See Jonathan Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers
Happier? (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/events/cigar
ettetax.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review), for a plausible empirical demonstration
that higher taxes on cigarettes actually increase the happiness of smokers, apparently
because smoking decreases happiness and taxes decrease smoking. One of the many
intriguing claims of this essay is this: People are willing to pay for cigarettes, and thus in
order to smoke, but smoking decreases welfare (on almost any understanding of that term)
for many or most smokers.
34. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of
Everything and the Value of Nothing 216-34 (2004) (questioning underlying assumptions
of CBA).
35. But see infra Part I.B.
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years by reference to survey evidence; the choice between QALYs and
WTP; and the fact that WTP might not adequately measure welfare.
I.

WELFARE AND

EQUITY,

LIVES AND LIFE-YEARS

Should government focus on statistical lives or statistical life-years?
We should be clear on the nature of the opposition between the two. No
regulatory program can eliminate death; if it is successful, it will merely
extend life. If regulators focus solely on statistical lives, they will be
lengthening lives, and they will be analyzing the consequences of regulation without regard to the extent of the lengthening. In fact they will be
ignoring that intuitively relevant consideration. The initial question,
then, is whether regulators should focus on statistical lives 36 rather than
life-years, even while acknowledging the fact that life extension is all that
is involved.
My goal in this section is to show that a focus on life-years should be
found desirable from a variety of different perspectives, and that it does
not offend justice-related constraints on regulatory policy. I suggest that
if welfare is the policy goal, it is exceedingly important to assess the number of life-years at stake. I suggest as well that such an assessment should
be appealing to those who are concerned with fairness or reciprocity. If
these claims are correct, it should be possible to obtain an incompletely
theorized agreement 3 7 on the relevance of life-years-an agreement from
a diverse set of theoretical perspectives, and one that does not depend on
resolution of disagreements about the proper foundations of regulatory
policy.
A methodological point before we begin: If the analysis is conducted
entirely within an economic framework, and if monetary values are all
that matter, this section is essentially irrelevant. The issue should be investigated by looking directly at the question that I intend to bracket for
the moment: willingness to pay. On an economic approach, the real
question is whether and how WTP varies over the lifespan; appropriate
policy follows from the answer to that question. But I believe that this
approach is too crude. WTP is relevant to regulatory choices, but for
several reasons it should not be decisive. First, agencies should provide,
and consider, qualitative descriptions of the benefits of regulations, not
merely quantitative ones. 38 Second, distributional issues are important;
if, for example, a regulation would mostly help children, and poor children in particular, that is an important matter to consider. Third, there
are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation.
36. I deliberately leave ambiguous the meaning of "focus." At a minimum, I mean to
suggest that government should assess the number of life-years at stake, and use the
resulting figure when the ultimate decision is otherwise difficult. See infra Part IV.
37. On the general idea, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict
35-38 (1996), discussing social uses of incompletely theorized agreements.
38. See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note 29, at 292-93 (arguing that the
"monetary 'bottom line' is... simply a helpful input into the decision").
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Before we investigate how to translate life-years into monetary
equivalents, it is necessary to see whether ethical constraints bar the
translation.
A. Behind the Veil of Ignorance
It should be clear that an emphasis on statistical lives neglects highly
pertinent information. Why should analysts blind themselves to that information? Other things being equal, and as a matter of simple logic, the
welfare gain from a program saving (say) one thousand people between
forty and sixty-five is unquestionably higher than the welfare gain from a
program saving (say) one thousand people who are sixty-five and over.
The former program does everything that the latter program does, and
much else besides. After all, the sixty-five-year-olds were themselves forty
once, and it would be astonishing if the welfare gain, to each of us, of ten
more years of life were generally equivalent to the welfare gain of forty
more years of life.
Nor does an emphasis on life-years disregard or downplay the welfare
of older people. Once programs focusing on life-years are in place, old
people will benefit from them no less than younger people, simply because those programs helped them at a younger stage and hence increased the likelihood that they would become old.3 9 In this sense, the
idea that a life-years approach prefers younger people over older people
is based on a kind of optical illusion-one that sees human life as a snapshot with everyone always at his or her current age, rather than a moving
picture in which people age over time. 40 In any case the life-years approach considers everyone's life-years the same, old people no less than
young people; it will argue for careful attention to risks that face significant numbers of old people.
To see the claim for considering life-years, imagine that people are
placed behind a veil of ignorance, 4 1 in which they do not know their
personal characteristics; they are unaware of their race, sex, wealth, or
39. There is one exception to this conclusion: people who were young while
government used statistical lives but became old after it switched to statistical life-years.
Such people could not, by hypothesis, benefit from statistical life-years when they were
younger. But it would be extremely odd to invoke this short-term problem as a reason to
continue with the idea of statistical lives if it is obviously inferior.
40. Note that a claim for attention to life-years does not mean that the nation is
devoting too little or too much in the way of resources to protect public health. Even if the
United States doubled, tripled, or quadrupled the money it spends on environmental
protection, for example, it would be necessary to decide how that money should be spent,
and here it would remain necessary to choose between statistical lives or statistical lifeyears.
41. See John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 136-42 (1971). 1 am using the idea of the veil
of ignorance for heuristic purposes, but not in the particular way that Rawls does. Rawls is
interested in issues involving the basic structure of society, see id. at 138, and it is not at all
clear that he believes that the veil should be used to assess the justice of particular
contested issues. Nonetheless, I believe that the veil of ignorance is an illuminating way of
testing the legitimacy of asking about life-years.

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 214 2004

2004]

LIVES, LIFE-YEARS, AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY

(most pertinently) age. Note that the veil of ignorance is intended to be
an extremely stringent constraint on choice, one that ensures that morally irrelevant factors will not play a biasing role. 4 2 If those behind the
veil would choose statistical life-years over statistical years, we have some
reason to believe that life-years do not violate ethical constraints on regulatory policy. Would people behind the veil be indifferent between a program that would eliminate risks that people would face at thirty and one
that would eliminate otherwise identical risks faced at sixty? If people do
not know how old they are, would they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better to eliminate a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million
teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million senior citizens? At
first glance, the choice is entirely clear. The program that saves more lifeyears is better, because it provides more welfare to its beneficiaries. From
behind a veil of ignorance, choosers would surely select the program that
protects younger people, and hence would make life-years highly relevant
43
to their own judgments.
Or consider the following question, addressed to a random population-wide sample:
You do not know how long you will live. Which of the following two
programs do you prefer:
(a) A program that would eliminate, startingnow andfor the rest
of your life after that point, a 1/200,000 risk of death.
(b) A program that would eliminate, starting at sixty-five and for
the rest of your life after that point, a 1/200,000 risk of death.
It would be truly astonishing if the overwhelming majority did not
prefer Program (a) over Program (b). (The minority would be those
sixty-five and older, and even they should be indifferent between the two
programs.) Perhaps a preference for Program (a) reflects, in part, the
discounting of future years, which (rationally or not 4 4 ) may not loom so
large in people's current calculations. 45 But the difference is highly likely
to reflect not merely discounting but also the fact that Program (a) provides more years of risk reduction. In answering questions of this kind,
reasonable people take account of the fact that the welfare benefit of
Program (a) is significantly higher than the welfare benefit of Program
(b). In fact Program (a) literally dominates Program (b): It provides
everything that Program (b) does, and more years of reduced risk as well.
It would be easy to design questions, for those behind the veil of igno42. See id. at 139-42. It is noteworthy here that Rawls uses the veil of ignorance as a
way of challenging utilitarianism itself. See id. at 142.
43. 1 take up ethical considerations in more detail below. See infra Part I.C.
44. On hyperbolic discounting, see Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse 93-94
(1992); David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, in Encyclopedia of Cognitive
Science 915, 916-19 (Lynn Nadel ed., 2003); David Laibson & Christopher Harris,
Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption, in I Advances in Economics and
Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress 258 (Mathias
Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003) .
45. On the issue of discounting future years, see Revesz, supra note 3, at 950-62.
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rance, that have this characteristic. A focus on statistical life-years allows
choosers to select programs that are better, on every dimension, than
programs that seem identical to those which focus on statistical lives.
Some cases are not as simple as this one, because they do not involve
lifetime risks. We could imagine a Program (c) that eliminates a risk
faced mostly by people between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, and a
Program (d) that eliminates a risk faced mostly by people between the
ages of seventy and seventy-five. Program (c) cannot be said to do everything that Program (d) does, and more. At least for members of the current generations, Program (d) protects people who are not protected by
Program (c); there is a real choice here. But Program (c) does provide
far more life-years, and because it enables (a certain number of) people
to reach the age of seventy in the first place, it seems preferable, other
things being equal, to Program (d).
In some exotic cases, however, a focus on life-years might seem to
reflect more contentious judgments of value. Consider the choice between two programs: Program (e), which would save one thousand infants, and Program (f), which would save one thousand ten-year-olds. On
the life-years approach, Program (e) is better, other things being equal.
But on one view, there are theoretical reasons to question a preference
for Program (e). Because Program (f) would save people who have accumulated memories and experiences, the individual loss might seem
higher; and because of the investment of family and friends, the social
loss might seem higher as well. 46 But to favor life-years, it is not necessary
to take a stand on these controversial claims. If Program (e) would save
one thousand infants, it will give them an opportunity to accumulate
memories and experiences, and to allow and to reward investments by
family and friends. Here as well, life should be seen as a moving picture
rather than a snapshot, and if it is, the apparent superiority of Program
(f) dissolves on reflection. In any event regulatory policies generally involve large populations, and for most such policies, an emphasis on lifeyears does not pose challenges of this kind.
B. Discrimination,Life-Years, and Welfare
Does a focus on life-years discriminate against older people in some
invidious or unacceptable way? It is tempting to reach this conclusion. 4 7
But illicit discrimination is not involved. As I shall show, the idea of statistical lives is at least as plausibly discriminatory as the idea of statistical lifeyears, because the former treats the remaining life-years of old people as
more valuable than the remaining life-years of young people. 48 And be46. For relevant discussion, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (1993) (exploring
pertinent values in euthanasia and abortion debates).
47. See McKie et al., supra note 21, at 47-71 (discussing argument that focusing on
QALY is "ageist").
48. Note that this is objectionable if, other things being equal, each person's life-year
counts for no less and no more than one. It is all the more objectionable if older people
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cause every old person was once young, and (with a little luck) young
people will eventually become old, an approach that emphasizes life-years
does not treat old people unfairly. To approach this question, let us begin with cases in which ethical constraints on the pursuit of welfare
through regulation seem most insistent.
Suppose that we could measure welfare directly through a kind of
hedometer. Suppose too that the hedometer does not rely on contentious conceptions of welfare; it is not narrowly limited to pleasure or happiness, and it includes the proper ingredients of welfare however these
are defined. 49 Suppose further that the hedometer is able to show that in
a relevant population, white people receive more welfare from their lives
than do African Americans. Hence, let us suppose, a program that would
save fifty white people (from cancer as a result of arsenic in drinking
water, for example) will produce greater welfare gains than a program
that would save sixty African Americans (from air pollution in the inner
city, for example). Certainly it is not unimaginable that the welfare gain
is higher for programs that protect whites than for programs that protect
an equivalent number of African Americans (though the opposite might
also be true). Gender differences are possible as well. Perhaps men
flourish more than women (though here too the opposite might be true).
If these examples seem too contentious, imagine that there are two social
groups, the Flourishing and the Depressed. Members of both groups are
easily identifiable, and their present and future welfare is captured in the
names of their respective groups. By stipulation, a program that protects
the lives of the Flourishing will produce more welfare than one that protects the lives of the Depressed. To sharpen the normative question, stipulate too that the Flourishing are partly responsible for the depression of
the Depressed; that if not for the active efforts of the Flourishing, the
Depressed would come closer to flourishing too. 50
are seen as having a larger "stock" of life-years and hence as comparatively "rich" in welfare
terms. In that event, the life-years of younger people deserve higher priority on
distributive grounds. I do not explore these complexities here.
49. Hence the term eudaimeter seems to me more fitting but more unwieldy. See the
discussion of eudaimonia in Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness 142-43, 343-72
(rev. ed. 2001).
50. This example is hypothetical and we lack hedometers. Those so inclined might
turn to V TP instead. See Viscusi, Racial Differences, supra note 3, at 248-52. Viscusi finds
that African American males have a significantly lower "WTP than white males: $7.7 million
versus $15.1 million. Id. at 252 tbl.5. He also finds that African American females have a
lower WTP than white females: $8.7 million versus $11.3 million. Id. Thus the overall VSL
for the white sample is $13.4 million, whereas the overall VSL for the African American
sample is $9.3 million, and the VSL for the white male sample is $15.1 million, much
higher than the VSL of $11.3 million for the white female sample. Id. If MTP is the basis
for government policy, agencies should be assigning a much higher VSL for whites and
men than for African Americans and women. Viscusi himself does not reach this
conclusion. He says that "because of the differences in market opportunities, it is
inappropriate to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by black
workers to bear risk." Id. at 255. Disparities along lines of race and gender are also shown
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Should government devote more resources to the protection of
those racial or ethnic groups that would gain more welfare from protection? Most people would find the very question absurd. In cases of these
sorts, there is an equality-based check on the pursuit of greater welfare.
In fact racial discrimination on this basis would be unconstitutional. But
what is the source of the equality-based check? In the context of race
discrimination, a central problem is that if African Americans receive less
welfare from their lives than do white people, a large part of the reason
lies in social and legal practices, past and present, which help produce
that state of affairs. This form of inequality reflects injustice. If government takes the inequality as a kind of given for the purposes of policy, it
is creating further injustice. In fact it is actually creating a kind of vicious
circle, in which disparities in welfare justify increased disparities in welfare, which in turn justify ever-increasing disparities in welfare. The ethical intuition is simple: Where demographic disparities in the welfare effects of
regulatory policies are a product of background injustice, government is properly
blocked from taking those disparities into account in formulating policy.
Two qualifications are important here. First, I am putting to one
side the possibility of adopting welfare-promoting regulatory policies
alongside redistributive tax-and-spending policies. 5' If government could
adopt programs that promoted welfare as such while simultaneously taking steps to correct injustice (through redistributive benefits for members
of the disadvantaged class), that might well be the preferred course. Second, I am also putting to one side the possibility that a race-blind and
gender-blind policy will be forcing African Americans and women to
"buy" regulatory protection that they reasonably believe not to be in their
interests. The second qualification is especially important.
As we shall see, a fully individuated system of regulation would not
force people to pay for benefits that they do not want-at least if there
are no third party effects and if they are not suffering from a lack of
information, including that produced by cognitive or motivational
problems. Such a fully individuated system would respond to unjustified
inequalities not by forced purchases, but by subsidies of various kinds to
those who need or deserve them. And in such a system, it would likely
in John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal
Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 257 (2003).
Of course the " TP numbers do not show or even suggest that when regulatory
programs save lives, African Americans and women gain less, in terms of welfare, than
whites and men. By itself, the lower 1A7TP demonstrates no such thing; as we shall see, WA7TP
is merely a proxy for welfare, and an especially crude one in the face of disparities in
income, wealth, and opportunities. Suppose that Donald Trump is willing to pay $500 to
eliminate a 1/50,000 risk of having migraine headaches for the next year; suppose too that
I am willing to pay only $25 to eliminate the same risk. The difference might well stem
only from differences in wealth; the welfare loss from migraine headaches would be the
same for the both of us. But it is certainly imaginable that some people, defined in
demographic terms, do obtain more welfare from their lives than others.
51. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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emerge that members of some groups would generally receive less, in the
way of protection against statistical risks, than would members of other
groups-just as members of some groups now receive less than others in
the way of protection from the statistical risks that arise from automobiles
and crime (if only because members of wealthier groups are willing to
pay more for risk reduction). If wealthy people buy more in the way of
risk-reduction than poor people do, we do poor people no favors by forcing them to buy the level of protection that rich people do. But we are
speaking here of welfare, not of willingness to pay. I am urging that even
if African Americans receive less welfare from risk reduction that do
whites, it would not be appropriate to base regulatory policy on that
difference.
This point has implications for the debate over the use of qualityadjusted life-years in regulatory policy. Insofar as the idea of QALYs is
designed to measure the benefits of health gains along with fatalities
averted, it makes a great deal of sense; reductions in curable cancers,
asthma attacks, and chronic bronchitis surely count as gains, whoever receives them. But suppose that people with severe physical and emotional
ailments can be benefited only moderately by protective interventionsand hence that the number of QALYs from such interventions is relatively
low simply because those who are helped cannot, in light of their disability, be helped much. Should government concentrate instead on programs for people with less severe ailments, on the theory that more
QALYs will be produced as a result? I believe that government should
not, simply because it is unjust to disfavor those whose ailments are most
serious. 52 This problem is not the same as the problem of disparities
across lines of race and gender, because the disparities were not caused,
even in part, by members of advantaged groups; but it raises analogous
5 3
concerns. I return to this issue below.
C. Life-Years, Fairness, and Reciprocity
Thus far I have suggested that considerations ofjustice constrain the
promotion of welfare through regulatory controls. But is the use of statistical life-years morally unacceptable in the same way as a VSL that discriminates on the basis of race or gender? This seems quite implausible. The
initial point is that it is hard to argue that injustice accounts for the welfare disparity between protection of a thirty-year-old and protection of a
sixty-year-old. The disparity comes from the simple fact that younger people have more years left. Now that disparity might itself be an injustice if
social practices, or even nature, singled out groups of people along lines
of (say) race, gender, or religion and gave them significantly shorter lives.
Hence the use of life-years would indeed be problematic if it systematically burdened members of identifiable social groups (an issue to which I
52. See the discussion of the "natural lottery" in Rawls, supra note 41, at 54-117.
53. See infra note 54.
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will return). But almost all of the time, the notion of life-years is demo54
graphically neutral, or very close to it, in both theory and practice.
Under the life-years approach, older people are treated worse for
only one reason: They are older. This is not an injustice. Every old person was young once, and every young person will be old too (if given the
chance). In fact an important form of reciprocity is built into the lifeyears approach. If regulatory policy is based on life-years, every person
will, in a sense, be both benefited and burdened, and in exactly the same
way. Indeed, every person will be both a beneficiary and a victim of the
relevant discrimination. People-the same people-will be benefited
when they are younger and burdened when they are older. They have no
cause to complain of an approach from which they gained at an earlier
stage. 55 It is hard to see how the relevant form of discrimination is illicit.
In fact it is not clear that it is a form of discrimination at all. Everyone's
life-year counts as no less and no more than one. It might even be possible to conclude that this argument from reciprocity is a free-standing justification of the life-years approach, putting issues of welfare entirely to
one side.
In an important sense, a focus on statistical lives can be seen as discriminatory, not a focus on statistical life-years. The former discriminates
against younger people, simply because it treats each of their years as less
valuable than those of older people. A program that uses statistical lives
accords far more value to each remaining year of an old person's life than
to each remaining year of a young person's life. 5 6 In fact any claim of
discrimination, against statistical lives or life-years, seems circular. Everything depends on the starting point against which we investigate the question of discrimination.
54. There is a possible qualification here if African Americans (for example) live
shorter lives, and if a focus on statistical life-years therefore ensures that African American
lives will be valued, on average, less than white lives. In theory, this is indeed a possible
problem. But in practice, regulatory policies that focus on statistical life-years do not run
into that problem, because they are too coarse-grained to discriminate in this fashion. If
discrimination arose in some contexts, the appropriate response would not be to refuse to
consider statistical life-years, but to have correctives for cases in which the use of that
criterion produces discrimination.
55. Arguments from reciprocity are not always convincing. Suppose, for example,
that certain people were beneficiaries of racial discrimination in the past, and at some
future point they are harmed by racial discrimination. At least it is not clear that the latter
form of discrimination can be justified by reference to the former. If not, the problem is
that discrimination is unjust. If my arguments in the text are correct, this problem does
not apply to the life-years criterion, because there is no injustice.
56. For a utilitarian, this approach is objectionable because each life-year, other
things being equal, is an equal source of utility, and hence a program should prefer more
life-years rather than fewer. We could imagine a kind of utilitarian or consequentialist who
would give higher priority to the welfare of the least well-off. In this context, who counts as
the least well-off? In an important sense, young people fall in that category, because they
have not yet had the opportunity to accumulate welfare; older people already have a large
welfare "stock." But a resolution* of these complexities is not important for my analysis
here.
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Can the circle be broken? Suppose that we conclude that lifetime
well-being is what matters, and that, other things being equal, policies
should not give some people more lifetime well-being than others. A policy that looks solely at statistical lives will violate this principle. Compare
a group of people who die from a certain risk at fifty with a group of
people who die from the same risk at seventy. Other things being equal,
the latter group has received significantly more lifetime well-being than
the former, and attention to statistical lives forces government to ignore
this fact. At the very least, an age-neutral statistical-lives approach cannot
be said to be more immune to a claim of illicit discrimination than an
approach that focuses on life-years.
D. Literal Age Discrimination?
Do these arguments undermine the widely accepted principle
against age discrimination? If so, the arguments might be thought to
have mischaracterized the ethical issues involved-or to have broad and
perhaps radical implications, calling for a rethinking of the prohibition
on age discrimination.
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 57 employers are forbidden from discriminating against people over forty.
They cannot choose a thirty-year-old over a fifty-year-old. Indeed, they
cannot discriminate even if they can claim that they are relying on a statistically sound generalization-as sound as those on which employers and
others rely every day. 58 It is not acceptable for an employer to conclude
that thirty-year-old teachers are more fit, energetic, and creative than
fifty-year-old teachers, even if this is generally true, and even if it is difficult, in individual cases, to test energy and creativity before people have
started to work. 59 Nor would it be permissible for an employer to adapt
the argument I have been defending here. An employer could not say
that he wants to hire people who have a large number of life-years lefteven if the employer could say, not implausibly, that he would like employees with many life-years rather than fewer, and even if he could add,
also not implausibly, that a life-years approach to hiring does not, in a
sense, discriminate against anyone. (Recall that every older person was
young once and that every younger person, if lucky, will eventually be
older too.) The question, in short, is whether it is possible to defend the
use of statistical life-years over statistical lives while also accepting the prohibition on age discrimination in employment. I believe that it is.
57. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
58. See Samuel Estreicher & Michael C. Harper, Cases and Materials on Employment
(discussing "statistical
Discrimination and Employment Law 445-47 (2000)
discrimination"). In some narrow circumstances, however, age might be a bona fide
occupational qualification. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413-17
(1985) (allowing bona fide occupational qualification defense in certain circumstances).
59. See Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 413-17 (noting that "the ADEA requires that age
qualifications be something more than 'convenient' or 'reasonable"').
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The initial point is that the prohibition on age discrimination in employment does not have anything like the same moral standing as the
corresponding prohibitions on race and sex discrimination. 60 But it is
easy to see how the former prohibition might be justified. Some age discrimination is undoubtedly a product of unthinking prejudice-of a false
61
If
belief that older people are unable to engage in certain tasks.
prejudice (in the form of wildly inaccurate stereotyping) is frequently responsible for age discrimination, perhaps age discrimination should generally be banned. A supplemental rationale would be that discrimination
on the basis of age inflicts a distinctive kind of dignitary harm-one that
makes it different from, and worse than, most kinds of employment-related injury. If an employee is fired because he is fifty-five, or not hired
for that reason, the psychological and dignitary injury is plausibly worse,
even far worse, than that faced by people who are fired or hired for most
62
other reasons. At least this view seems to animate the ADEA.
The key point is that whether prejudice or dignitary harm is the basis
of the ADEA, the same problems do not raise doubts about the government's use of statistical life-years. When government uses life-years, it is
not because it is prejudiced against older people or acting on the basis of
unreliable stereotypes about them. There is no overgeneralization here.
Nor is it easy to show that a dignitary harm of the sort involved in the
employment context is an issue here. It is one thing to be told by a specific employer that you will be fired or not hired because you are too old.
It is quite another thing for the government to use an approach that focuses on life-years rather than lives. To be sure, it is possible to characterize such an approach in a way that does inflict dignitary harm. Perhaps
some objections to life-years stem from a perception that this measure
values older people less, treating them as "worth" some fraction of
younger people. But these objections rest on a kind of rhetorical trick,
and a highly misleading way of framing what the idea of life-years is all
about. In fact they seem to be based on a kind of moral heuristic, one
that overgeneralizes the ban on age discrimination to apply it to a context
63
in which it does not belong.

60. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination? The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 780, 783 (1997)
(urging that the ADEA benefits a "concerted and politically powerful group of
Americans").
61. See Estreicher & Harper, supra note 58, at 444-45.
62. See id. I am assuming that the statute can be justified and is not simply responsive
to interest-group power.
63. On moral heuristics generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral
Framing, 88 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Moral Heuristics].
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E. Bad Luck in the Natural Lottery (with a Note on Sex Discrimination)
There is, however, one set of ethical constraints on the life-years approach. The relevant cases are unusual, but they are not hard to specify.
Compare two programs:
(a) ProgramA would eliminate a risk faced by people who are ten years
old or younger, but who have a life expectancy of forty years or less,
because they have a preexisting condition that will likely lead to premature mortality.
(b) Program B would eliminate a risk faced by people who are thirty
years old, but who have a life expectancy of seventy or more, because
they are in good health.
On the life-years approach, Program B is better. But is it clearly better in principle? Note that if it is objectionable, it is not for the same
reason as an approach that discriminates on the basis of race or sex. Social injustice is not responsible for the low life expectancy of the people
who would be helped by Program A. (Let us so stipulate; if social injustice is involved, the case is close to those of race and sex discrimination.)
Instead the problem, for the beneficiaries of Program A, is bad luck in
the "natural lottery. ' ' 64 People whose life expectancy is low as a result of
pre-existing conditions have been dealt an unfortunate blow by fate. In
my view, government should take reasonable steps to ameliorate such
blows. A life-years approach that does not attempt to counteract injustice
in the natural lottery would be unjust.
This point very much bears on medical interventions and on government funding for medical projects. But it is rarely raised by regulatory
policy. Typically government is deciding whether to adopt regulations
that reduce pollution or otherwise increase safety across large populations. From the standpoint of the natural lottery, use of the life-years
criterion does not give rise to objections in the vast bulk of such cases.
But the life-years approach might also turn out to create intriguing questions in the context of programs that disproportionately benefit men or
women. The life expectancy of women is higher than the life expectancy
of men. As of 2000, the average life expectancy for men at birth was 74.1
years, but 79.5 years for women. 65 A breast cancer prevention program
might well protect more life-years than an otherwise identical program
designed to protect men. 66 I cannot defend this view here, but I believe
that a neutral use of the life-years approach is not unacceptably discriminatory even ifit produces more attention to women than to men64. See Rawls, supra note 41, at 75.
65. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fast Stats A
to Z: Life Expectancy, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm

(last reviewed

Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

66. To make the issue more concrete, compare two programs: Program A would save
one thousand women with a median age of sixty. Program B would save one thousand
men with a median age of sixty. Under the life-years approach, Program A is better,
because it would protect more life-years.
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though a formal commitment to sex equality, or to counteracting the effects of the natural lottery, would raise real doubts.
F. Analogies
I have suggested that ethical limits on the pursuit of welfare do not
bar attention to statistical life-years in the design of regulatory policy. But
a possible counterargument would point to an analogy from the criminal
law. Those who kill older people are not punished less harshly than those
who kill younger people. In fact it would be extremely surprising to find
a criminal sentencing policy that imposes higher sentences on those who
kill people under thirty than on those who kill people over fifty.6 7 Suppose that a politician, or a sentencing commission, seriously proposed
that those who kill old people should have more lenient punishments.
Such a proposal would be regarded with extreme outrage. If criminal
punishment treats lives as equivalent, and does not make life-years relevant, why, it might be asked, should regulation be any different?
Part of the answer lies in the sheer heinousness of murder. The intentional killing of another human being is, in terms of its consequences,
so bad that the age of the victim is a matter of relative indifference. By
contrast, regulation deals not with intentional killing, but with the management of statistical risks created by people who do not want to kill anyone. In any case, the system of criminal justice focuses not solely on social consequences but also on the character of the act and the
perpetrator. If this is the focus, a murderer of a young person is unlikely
to be significantly worse, from the moral point of view, than a murderer
of an older person. To be sure, a system of criminal law that is focused
entirely on welfare might treat the killing of a forty-year-old as worthy of
more punishment than the killing of an eighty-year-old. But the criminal
justice system is responsive to moral outrage, not only welfare, 68 and it is
the killing of the most vulnerable people, not the killing of the youngest
people, that produces moral outrage. What I am suggesting here is that
the moral judgments that underlie the criminal law are not a good test
for the moral judgments that underlie the system of regulation.
It makes sense to think that regulation, in the context of safety and
health, is less analogous to criminal prohibitions on murder than to the
system of civil damages-which generally does make life-years relevant.
Many state courts, including several state supreme courts, have calculated
damages in wrongful death cases by assigning a net value to each remaining year the decedent would likely have lived. These courts have used life
67. It would be less surprising to find a sentencing policy that imposes severe
punishment on those who murder children. But here the reason for the severity would be
the special vulnerability of children, not the fact that they have many life-years left.
68. For evidence, see Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide
Cases and the Role of Vengeance, 32J. Legal Stud. 363, 378-80 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et
al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. Legal Stud. 237, 239 (2000). I am not
trying here to reach any conclusion about the proper goals of the criminal law.
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expectancy tables and projected annual earnings to determine lost income. 69 Several courts have gone further and used estimated life expectancy to determine damages for loss of society or consortium. 7 ° In these
states, the lives of young people are presumptively more valuable than
those of the elderly. In this respect, the use of life-years, as part of an
understanding of appropriate policy, is hardly foreign to the legal system.
Or consider a final way to get at the issue. On one view, people have
a moral entitlement to have a chance to live a human life of normal
length. 71 It follows that there is a special moral objection if members of a
relevant population are dying at the age of thirty or forty-an objection
that does not apply if members of a relevant population are dying at the
age of seventy or eighty. If people have a moral entitlement to avoid
(excessive risks of) premature death, then government legitimately devotes special attention to otherwise identical risks faced at relatively early
places in the lifespan. Those who emphasize the importance of providing
people with ordinary longevity should find a focus on life-years compatible with their goals. 72 In any case a special virtue of focusing on life-years
is that it ensures attention to a crucial question, which is whether affected
73
citizens have had an opportunity to live a number of years already.
69. See, e.g., Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 N.E.2d 212, 219 (Ind. 2001) (allowing loss
of consortium damages from date of death to end of life expectancy); Payne v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 60 P.3d 469, 473 (Mont. 2002) (considering loss of future earnings in
determining recovery in wrongful death action); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 845-46
(N.M. 1994) (basing monetary worth of decedent's life on factors such as earning capacity
and life expectancy); Davidson v. Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483, 493 n.2 (Tenn. 2003)
(including Social Security payments for duration of life expectancy in calculation of
award).
70. See, e.g., Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 766 (Ind.
2001) (allowing loss of consortium damages for period after spouse's death); Thomas v.
Hilburn, 654 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1995) (basing monetary worth of decedent's life on
factors such as earning capacity and life expectancy).
71. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 78 (2000).
Nussbaum lists, as the first of "central human functional capabilities ....
[b]eing able to
live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's
life is so reduced as to be not worth living." Id. Complex issues are raised by the
application of this idea to the context of social risks (and hence I do not adopt her
phrasing here). Suppose, for example, that citizens in a population of two hundred
million are exposed to a median annual mortality risk of 1/500,000 from all causes
(including, for example, motor vehicle accidents, cigarette smoking, alcohol use, air
pollution, water pollution, pesticides, occupational accidents, homicide, hunger, and
much more). This would be an exceptionally safe population-safer, in fact, than any
society in the history of the world. But of that population, four hundred people would die
each year, many of them prematurely.
72. A focus on life-years is not, of course, the same as an effort to ensure that everyone
has a chance to have a lifespan of ordinary length. My only suggestion is that an approach
that looks at statistical lives, and does not look at life-years, is less likely to provide that
chance than an approach that makes life-years relevant.
73. Note that this is a different question from the life-years question, though it is
overlapping. Consider two programs: Program A would remove a statistical risk from a
population of people who are forty; their life expectancy is sixty-five. Program B would
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II. MONETIZATION

These points suggest that in deciding whether to regulate, government should consider life-years saved, not merely lives saved (a misleading way of framing the alternative, which is really lives extended).74 The
government's qualitative analysis of the benefits of regulation should attend to that issue. And if life-years are the focus, it is possible to engage
in cost-effectiveness analysis, seeing how many life-years are obtained for
given investments in regulatory protection. Government might therefore
reallocate some of the resources devoted to programs protecting the elderly to programs protecting younger people. 75 But suppose that government seeks to engage not merely in cost-effectiveness analysis but also in
cost-benefit analysis. If this is what it seeks to do, it will have to turn lifeyears into monetary equivalents. For most economists, the valuation of
regulatory benefits, and the monetization of life-years, depends on
WTP. 7 6 Should WTP be used here?
Many people have discussed the uses and limitations of WTP as a
measure of regulatory benefits; the debate is a spirited one. 7 7 My own
view, defended below, is that the argument for using WTP is strongest
when the beneficiaries of regulation are adequately informed and would
bear all or almost all of its cost. 78 And at first glance, the use of W'TP, as a
remove the same statistical risk from a population of people who are fifty; their life
expectancy is eighty. On the life-years approach, Program B is to be preferred. But if we
are focusing on the numbers of years that people have had already, Program A might be
better.
74. There are some exotic variations that I do not deal with here. Compare two
programs: Program A would save fifty people who are ten years old. Program B would save
one hundred people who are forty-six years old. If life expectancy is eighty, then the first
program would save 3,500 life-years, whereas the second would save 3,400 life-years. Is it so
clear that Program A is to be preferred? If not, it might be because reasonable people
would prefer something like a weighted average of lives saved and life-years saved, so that a
large number of people, and a small number of life-years, woild receive more attention
than life-years alone suggest, just as a small number of people, and a large number of lifeyears, would receive less attention. I do not deal with that possibility here. If government
concentrated on life-years for purposes of regulation, it is likely that this issue would
balance out in the end. The area of medical treatment is one in which the issue might
have more practical importance.
75. This would be an extension of the reallocations aimed at in Stephen Breyer,
Breaking the Vicious Circle 55-81 (1993).
76. See, e.g., V. Kerry Smith et al., Do the "Near" Elderly Value Mortality Risks
Differently? (2002), available at http://www.aere.org/meetings/0106workshop-Smith.pdf
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
77. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 195-216 (1993);
Peter Dorman, Markets and Mortality 51-106 (1996); Kristin Shrader-Frechette,
Environmental Justice 135-62 (2002); Viscusi, Tradeoffs, supra note 1, at 3-74.
78. Where the beneficiaries are poor or otherwise seriously deprived, and when they
are informed but unwilling to pay much for reduction of serious risks, the appropriate
response is not to mandate regulation that might not be in their interest, but instead to
provide them with resources that will ensure risk reduction. I do not deal here with the
possible approach of risk-reduction-with-subsidy. See Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic,
supra note 3, at 2299-2301, for a brief treatment.
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way of monetizing benefits, creates no special or novel issues in the context of life-years. 79 Under the economic framework, the goal should be
to calculate people's WTP for statistical years over the lifespan. We would
want to know, for example, how much thirty-year-olds, forty-year-olds,
fifty-year-olds, and others are willing to pay to eliminate or reduce risks
faced in some or all of their remaining life-years. WTP, for statistical lifeyears, would be compiled by finding the relevant numbers and applying
the appropriate discount rate. To be sure, this would be a daunting empirical task. 8° But in principle, it is a conventional application of the economic framework. It would also seem to promise greater accuracy than
an approach that uses a uniform number for statistical lives. It would be
astonishing if that uniform number accurately captures the WTP of people at diverse points along the spectrum of possible ages.
I do not intend to reach any final conclusions here about the place
of WTP in regulatory policy. But I do address an evidentiary gap and a
possible paradox. The gap consists of the absence of evidence of how
VSLY varies over people's lifespans. We do not know how much thirtyyear-olds are willing to pay to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing their
remaining life-years, and how that amount compares with the WTP of
fifty-year-olds to eliminate the same risk. If we are interested in measuring actual WTP, it would be surprising to find a constant amount over the
lifespan. Unfortunately, the relevant amounts cannot be found in the
existing literature. The paradox is the possibility that WTP would actually
be higher to protect older people than younger people-if and because
older people are willing to pay more to eliminate statistical risks than
younger people. This is a paradox, because it suggests that WTP might
be higher to produce lower gains in terms of life-years. One of my goals
is to explain how and why this might be so. Finally, I explore an issue for
which the life-years debate can be seen as an opening wedge: whether
government should use a uniform WTP or instead a highly variable one,
making numerous distinctions according to context. But let us begin
with some basics.
79. With one important exception: the difficult and vexing question of whether and
how to calculate WTP for children. A uniform WTP for a statistical life avoids that
question; so too with a uniform WTP for a statistical life-year; so too with WTP for statistical
life-years that makes a sudden break at, say, age sixty-five. But an approach that tries to
calculate I,rP for each life-year over the lifespan would have to resolve the issue of
whether and how to calculate WITP for children. I do not address that issue directly here.
Certainly it would be intolerable, on both justice and welfare grounds, to treat the lives of
children as worth nothing, or little, simply because they have little ability and hence little
willingness to pay.
80. Note in this regard that there are complex relationships among risks and the
lifespan. Some risks, for example, might be constant over the remainder of life, so that a
thirty-year-old faces (say) a 1/1,000,000 chance of death from that risk for each of her
remaining years. But other risks might be somewhat higher or somewhat lower in later
years. If the calculation were to seek accuracy, it would use fine-grained numbers about
WITP over the lifespan for different risks. Administrable numbers would of course be far
less fine-grained.
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A. WTP and VSL in General
Advocates of the WTP criterion urge that as a measure of welfare,
WTP has the promise of both accuracy and administrability.8s While it is
not always simple to calculate WTP, market measures and contingent valuation studies provide a great deal of information. The government has
placed heavy reliance on labor market studies, which suggest a WTP that
substantially varies but that has a median in the general range of $6.1
million.8 2 These studies purport to show that in the market, people receive a certain level of compensation to run statistical risks, revealing an
ascertainable "price" for potential hazards. 83 In ordinary markets, there
is a market for safety, with some products (like Volvos) receiving higher
prices partly because they reduce statistical risks. People are willing to
pay specified amounts for risk reduction. On one view, markets provide
relevant information about appropriate prices, and regulators should
draw on that information, refusing to force people to buy more than they
would (if well informed).
Of course it is possible to question existing studies on various
grounds and to ask whether real world data actually reveal people's WTP
for increases in safety.8 4 The government relies on twenty-six studies,
finding that $6.1 million is the mean of a diverse area of figures-an approach that has a large degree of arbitrariness in itself.8 5 Contingent valuation studies, asking people how much they are willing to pay for eliminating statistical risks, might seem to produce more reliable answers,
simply because the answers to such questions are far less "noisy" than
81. The point should not be overstated. Studies of VWrTP show a great deal of
variability, see Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2284 (showing a range
from under $1 million to more than $16 million), and a recent study, based on 1990s data,
suggests that the current figure of $6.1 million might well be doubled, see Viscusi, Racial
Differences, supra note 3, at 252 (finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of
white males).
82. See EPA, Clear Skies, supra note 9, at 32 (finding VSL figure of $6.12 million);
Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2774 (explaining derivation of $6.1
million VSL).
83. See Viscusi, Tradeoffs, supra note 1, at 49, 51-55 (summarizing various VSL
studies); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. Econ. Literature 1912,
1924-35 (1993) (evaluating studies of fatal and nonfatal risks using labor market data); W.
Kip Viscusi & Joseph Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review, 27 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 5, 41-42 tbl.8 (2003).
84. See, e.g., Shrader-Frechette, supra note 77, at 149 (doubting existence of
compensating wage differentials); William T. Dickens, Assuming the Can Opener:
Hedonic Wage Estimates and the Value of Life, in A Hedonics Primer for Economists and
Attorneys 145 (John 0. Ward ed., 1992) (generally challenging those estimates); Dorman,
supra note 77, at 32-50 (same); William T. Dickens, Differences Between Risk Premiums in
Union and Nonunion Wages and the Case for Occupational Safety Regulation, 74 Am.
Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 320, 323 (1984) (dividing workers between union and
nonunion sectors and using results to doubt idea of compensating wage differentials).
85. EPA, Clear Skies, supra note 9, at 32.
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market behavior. But contingent valuation studies raise serious problems
86
of their own.
Let us assume that these difficulties can be solved and that existing
studies can indeed measure people's WTP for increases in safety. There
is certainly a connection between WTP and welfare. The more that someone is willing to pay for a benefit, the more likely it is that the benefit
would actually promote that person's welfare. But if welfare is our guide,
the WTP criterion might be criticized on several grounds. Consider a
few:
1. Willingness to pay is dependent on ability to pay. As a result, poor people (including many young people, who lack
income or wealth of their own) might be unwilling to pay
much for a regulatory benefit even though they would
greatly gain from it, and wealthy people might be willing to
pay a great deal for a regulatory benefit even though they
would receive very little from it.87 The most serious problem is that those without funds might be unwilling to pay for
regulatory benefits that would greatly improve their welfare.
2. Some people lack relevant information, and hence they
might not be willing to pay for goods that would, in fact,
produce significant welfare benefits for them. They might
also be willing to pay a great deal for goods that would not,
in fact, produce significant welfare benefits for them. It is
well documented that people's welfare judgments at the
time of decision ("anticipated welfare") do not always match
their experience ("experience welfare"). i s Hence the perceived benefits of regulatory protection might be lower than
the actual benefits.
3. People's preferences might have adapted to deprivation or
injustice. 89 Hence they might be unwilling to pay anything
for goods from which they would benefit. If government relies on WTP, it will not engage in actions that might turn
out to be welfare-promoting.
86. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 49-52 (1994) (casting doubt on
validity of WTP surveys); Note, "Ask A Silly Question...": Contingent Valuation of Natural
Resources Damages, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1981, 1984-90 (1992) ("[T]he answers generated by
[contingent valuation] surveys are not reliable guides to underlying preferences over
environmental resources.").
87. As we shall see, this point does not justify abandoning WTP in cases in which poor
people must pay the full cost of the benefit that the government is providing, at least if
those people are adequately informed.
88. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do
People Know What They Will Like?, 5J. Behav. Decision Making 187, 190 (1992) (finding
that individuals do not predict changes in taste particularly well); Loewenstein & Schkade,
supra note 32, at 88-94 (discussing difficulty of predicting emotions).
89. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109-24
(1983); Nussbaum, supra note 71, at 111-66; Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities
52-53 (1985).
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Contrary to what conventional economic theory would predict, there is often a large difference between people's WTP
and their willingness to accept (WTA) money for the same
good. 90 A remarkable study finds that when people are
asked how much they would be willing to pay to reduce a
small risk from an insecticide, the average response is $3.78;
but seventy-seven percent of similar people refused to buy
the product at any price, however reduced, if the risk level
would increase by an equivalent amount.9 1 Significant disparities are found in other studies. 92 WTA is usually at least
double WTP; if we do not have good reason to prefer WTP,
its use will significantly understate monetary value. 93
As I have noted, measures of WTP rely on hedonic pricing
or contingent valuation studies that elicit monetary amounts
from individuals, with the apparent assumption that such individuals will be paying those amounts whether or not other
people are doing so as well. 9 4 But people care about their
relative economic position, not simply their absolute economic position, 9 5 and hence they would be likely to be willing to pay significantly more if they could be assured that
others would be paying for the regulatory benefit as well.
The reason is that when everyone is paying for the benefit,
people can maintain their relative economic position while
also receiving the benefit. Because existing studies do not
take account of this point, they might undervalue regulatory
96
protections.

I do not intend to come to terms with these problems; I will bracket
the more general challenges to WTP itself and assess the questions here
within the existing framework, in which WTP plays a central role. But it is
noteworthy that actual agency use of WTP does not run afoul of most of
these problems. 97 The most important point here is that agencies do not

90. See Jack L. Knetsch, Reference States, Fairness, and Choice of Measure to Value
Environmental Changes, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior 13, 15-24 (Max Bazerman
et al. eds., 1997).
91. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer
Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RANDJ. Econ. 465, 474, 477 (1987).
92. See the summary in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 249-50
(1997).
93. On some of the complexities here, and the choice between VAITP and WATA, see
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227,
1242-55 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106,
130-31 (2002).
94. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative
Position, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 323, 326 (2001).
95. See Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever 107-21 (1999).
96. See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 94, at 326.
97. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, in Cost-Benefit Analysis 269, 280-89 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner eds., 2001).
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give a lower VSL for poor people than for rich people; they use a uniform
figure .9
B. WTP and Age: Evidence
If WTP is the proper measure of VSLY, it would follow that in order
to convert life-years into monetary equivalents, regulators should investigate how much people, at various stages of life, are willing to pay for years
of risk reduction. In principle, WTP might or might not vary over the
lifespan; there is no good a priori answer to that question. For children,
the elicitation of WTP is especially vexing, because children usually do
not have significant assets of their own, and because parental WTP is far
from an adequate proxy for children's interests here. 9 9 EPA relies on a
single population-wide WTP as a default assumption,"' but there is no
simple theoretical justification for this approach. And perhaps studies
would show that older people are willing to pay more for each of their
remaining life-years than younger people are willing to pay for each of
theirs-so that even if we focus on life-years, the "remainder of life" for
older people is as high as or even higher than that for younger people.
Imagine, for example, that people who are sixty-five and over are not
willing to pay less to eliminate a life-time risk of 1/500,000 than are people who are forty and under. We could speculate about different possible
results here. Perhaps labor market studies would show that the value of a
statistical life steadily decreases over the lifespan; 0 1 perhaps they would
show that VSL steadily increases; perhaps VSL rises to a certain age and
declines thereafter. On one view, the right question for purposes of policy is what well-designed studies actually establish.
Unfortunately, no studies to date provide clear answers to the key
questions. Hence an approach that uses life-years cannot easily translate
the relevant figure into dollar equivalents. If government uses a uniform
number-say, $172,000 per life-year' 02-it will not be tracking actual
WTP if WTP varies across the lifespan and if different programs protect
people at diverse ages. Perhaps the uniform number captures the population-wide mean and is therefore accurate (enough). But it is possible
that within the economic framework, a life-years approach that uses a uniform VSLY will produce wildly inaccurate measures of benefits.
98. See id. at 286-88. Note that it would be reasonable to use a nonuniform figure in
the context of forced exchanges. Unless there is some informational problem, poor
people are not helped when regulation forces them to pay $200 for a benefit that is worth
on!y $50 to them. In such cases, perhaps government should impose regulation but
subsidize poor people to ensure that they do not have to pay for it. I return to this point
infra note 115.
99. For an overview that turns out to be highly tentative and indeterminate, see EPA,
Children's Health, supra note 8.
100. See id. at 3-12 to 3-13 (referring to EPA, Guidelines, supra note 27).
101. For a result in this general direction, see Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 83, at 47-48.
102. See supra note 18.
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Consider a recent investigation that attempts to resolve exactly that
issue. 10 3 The study asked respondents in the United States and Canada
to state their willingness to pay for risk reductions of 1/1000 and 5/1000.
Demographic information was collected, so that the authors could hold
constant relevant variables (such as health and income). A key finding is
that in the United States, age had no impact on WTP. In the 1/1000
condition, VSL estimates exceeded $4 million; the estimates were less
than half that in the 5/1000 condition.' 0 4 But in both cases, older people did not show a lower WTP than younger people. In Canada, age generally had no effect, but with one exception: People over seventy were
willing to pay about one-third less than others for risk reduction. 05 The
authors conclude that in general, their results support the government's
"current practice with regard to treatment of age," 10 6 because they suggest that WTP does not vary across the lifespan. If the findings of this
study are accurate, then multiplication of the number of statistical lifeyears by a uniform VSLY will produce erroneous numbers, above all because it will understate the total W'TP of older people for their remaining
years.
Or consider another study based on labor market data.' 0 7 The simple result is that older workers require significantly higher, not lower,
compensation to accept increases in fatality risks on the job. For the full
sample, the estimated VSL is $5.31 million, well within the range of existing EPA figures. 0 8s The authors actually find that VSL increases with
age, from $7.4 million for workers between fifty-one and fifty-five, to
$10.2 million for workers between fifty-six and sixty, to $14 million for
workers between sixty-one and sixty-five.' 0 9 The implication is that regulatory policy should give a higher monetary value to statistical risks faced
by older people. Instead of a "senior death discount," regulators should
use a "youth death discount." If the findings in this study are right, the
"remainder of life" is actually worth more to older people, even though
they have fewer life-years left. Any exercise of multiplication-of lifeyears times actual VSLY across the lifespan-could actually result in
higher numbers for those who are older, notwithstanding what I have
said above about welfare. Hence a uniform VSLY would produce real
inaccuracy.
I do not mean to address here whether the particular findings in
these two studies are convincing. Other studies find that older people
show a lower VSL than younger people do. 11 0 This finding seems intui103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Alberini et al., supra note 26, at 14-16.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
See Smith et al., supra note 76, at 2.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 15.
See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 83, at 50-53.
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tive, simply because older people have fewer years to protect. But if VSL
does not decline with age, it remains to explain why."1 The simplest
answer is that older people have less to do with their money and hence
lower opportunity costs (unless the bequest motive is very strong). Because fewer years of life remain, savings are a lower priority, and older
people have less, in general, on which to use their resources. But the full
story is somewhat speculative and certainly more complex.
A possible contributing factor is wealth itself: If older people have
more income and wealth than younger people, their WTP will be higher,
and for reasons that have nothing to do with welfare. Some of the studies
finding no age differences in WTP do control for income."l 2 But they do
not control for wealth, which is an important missing variable. Older
people have more savings even if they have lower incomes, and hence the
higher WTP might reflect a wealth effect. (Recall that wealthy people will
show a higher WTP simply because they have more money.) There is a
complementary explanation. It might be that older people have a comparatively high WTP-as high as or higher than that of younger peoplebecause they have fewer years left in which to spend. Suppose, for example, that people over sixty are willing to pay $100 to eliminate a risk of 1/
50,000, whereas people under forty are willing to pay only $75 to eliminate such a risk. It may be that the younger people want to use their
disposable income on other things, including savings (of less use to the
elderly), whereas for older people, the reduction of risk is a high priority.
In short, older people have lower opportunity costs. Unless the bequest
motive is powerful, they will be especially willing to use what they have to
reduce statistical risks.
This possibility is related to another one: The comparatively high
WTP for older people might reflect the preciousness of the relatively few
years that remain. Consider two questions:
1. You are 75 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to
avoid a 10 percent chance of dying one year earlierthan you otherwise would?
2. You are 25 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to
avoid a 10 percent chance of dying one year earlierthan you otherwise would?
It is easily imaginable that question (1) would produce a far higher
WTP than question (2) for respondents answering hypothetically, and
even more predictably for respondents who are actually seventy-five and
twenty-five respectively. It may well be that the perceived value of any
111. I am assuming that well-conducted WTrP studies will not find decreases as
remaining life-years decrease. It is possible, of course, that some such studies will find such
decreases, see id., as the studies discussed supra text accompanying notes 103-109 do not.
I am attempting in this section to show that even if older people do not show a lower WAITP
to reduce statistical risks, this fact can be explained while acknowledging that other things
being equal, a program that provides more life-years is better on welfare grounds than one
that provides fewer.
112. See, e.g., Alberini et al., supra note 26, at 7.
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given year increases, for some or many, when the number of remaining
years declines. For people who are twenty-five, the prospect of losing one
year of life might not loom terribly large, but for people who are seventyfive, that loss is probably a matter of major importance. Undoubtedly the
different answers are partly a product of discounting, rational or otherwise; but this is not all that is involved. For those with fewer years remaining, each particular year becomes all the more valuable.
In some cases, the absence of age-related differences in WTP might
well be a product of the contingent valuation setting. Some studies of
contingent valuation show "scope neglect": People are willing to pay the
same to protect two thousand, twenty thousand, and two hundred thousand migratory birds. 1 3 The absence of an age effect may reflect a similar phenomenon. It is possible that in contingent valuation studies or in
market behavior, the number of years is "telescoped" into a kind of single
unit, called "the rest of life." Hence the amount that people are willing to
pay for a 1/500,000 risk of losing "the rest of life" might not much vary
across the lifespan.
It is also possible that older people are generally risk-averse, and differences in risk preferences might help account for differences in WTP.
Other things being equal, it is imaginable that older people would pay
more to reduce an annual risk of 1/500,000 than younger people would,
simply because younger people are more willing to run low-probability
risks. According to expected utility theory, risk-related judgments are
made by multiplying the extent of the harm by its probability; but according to prospect theory, people are generally risk-averse with respect to
low-probability risks of catastrophe. 114 Perhaps older people are, with respect to such risks, even more risk-averse than the population median.
For present purposes, it is not necessary to choose among these various
explanations. My central point is that there are plausible reasons why
WTP might not decline with remaining life-years.
C. Using WTP? Regulation as Forced Exchange
Now let us turn to the central question of valuation. I have suggested
that government should focus on life-years rather than lives. But should
life-years be valued by using WTP for them? My ultimate conclusion is
that WTP is, in principle, a plausible place not to end but to start. The
case for using WTP for statistical life-years is not weaker than the case for
using WTP for statistical lives. But there are a number of complexities
113. William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with
Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in Contingent Valuation: A Critical
Assessment 91, 94 fig.1 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
114. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, in Choices, Values, and Frames 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000). For a clear discussion with application to law, see Chris Guthrie,
Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163, 168-69
(2000).
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here, and they illuminate some of the virtues and vices of using WTP in
general.
Begin with the simplest set of cases: those in which the cost of the regulatory benefit is entirely borne by those who are supposed to benefit from it. I suggest
that in this set of cases, WTP is generally the appropriate measure unless
an informational problem or cognitive error is distorting people's
1 15
assessments.
To see why, compare two programs:
A. Program A would mostly benefit people thirty years old and under.
The median WTP for such people is $50 to eliminate a lifetime
statisticalrisk of 1/200,000.
B. Program B would mostly benefit people sixty-five and older. The
median WTP for such people is $100 to eliminate a lifetime statistical risk of 1/200,000.
Suppose that in both cases, the full cost of the benefit would be paid
by those who receive it. I have argued that the welfare benefit of Program
A is higher than the welfare benefit of Program B. But it does not follow
that the government should adopt a more expensive regulation to implement Program A than to implement Program B. The reason is that
under the numbers as given, the dollar payments reflect a welfare loss,
and those who are asked to pay $60 for Program A are losing more, in
welfare terms, than are those who are asked to pay $60 for Program B. So
long as the beneficiaries of both programs would pay their full cost, so
long as there are no third-party effects, and so long as people's WTP is
not distorted by informational problems or cognitive errors, government
should not impose a cost of over $50 on those who would benefit from
115. The Office of Management and Budget has recognized the importance of these
distortions:
Even when adequate information is available, people can make mistakes by
processing it poorly. Poor information-processing often occurs in cases of low
probability, high-consequence events, but it is not limited to such situations. For
instance, people sometimes rely on mental rules-of-thumb that produce errors. If
they have a clear mental image of an incident which makes it cognitively
"available," they might overstate the probability that it will occur. Individuals
sometimes process information in a biased manner, by being too optimistic or
pessimistic, without taking sufficient account of the fact that the outcome is
exceedingly unlikely to occur. When mistakes in information processing occur,
markets may overreact.
Circular A-4, supra note 14, at 5. On cognitive errors in a particularly important area, see
Frank A. Sloan et al., The Smoking Puzzle: Information, Risk Perception, and Choice
(2003). The authors show a significant role for excessive optimism, see id. at 122-23, 127,
161; they also show that smokers often lack a vivid sense of harms to quality of life, and that
such a sense is likely to affect behavior, see id. at 180-81. Even if no cognitive problem is
involved, a third-party effect would of course support departing from IATP. Note also that
if WTP is low for a benefit from which people would gain a great deal, a government
subsidy would seem appropriate. Thus, for example, if poor people are willing to pay little
to reduce a substantial risk, the best response might be to impose the regulation and to
ensure that taxpayers pay for it-or simply to transfer more money to poor people.
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Program A. At the same time, it should be willing to impose a cost of up
to $100 on those who would benefit from Program B.
Under the analysis I am suggesting, government should be willing to
impose more costly and aggressive regulations in some cases in which the
anticipated welfare gain (on one side of the equation) is lower. Is this a
contradiction? It is not. Consider two other programs:
C. Program C would eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by
poor people, whose median WTP is $10.
D. ProgramD would eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by
wealthy people, whose median WTP is $50.
Under plausible assumptions, Program C and Program D would produce identical welfare gains. In the abstract, there is no reason to think
that wealthy people gain more than do poor people from the elimination
of a statistical risk. But in light of the fact that they have little money, the
payment of $10 is worse for poor people than for wealthy people; hence
the welfare loss of paying $10 is higher for them. This point explains the
difference in WTP. Program C might well give its beneficiaries the welfare equivalent of Program D; but insofar as Program C is taking money
from those same beneficiaries, it is removing more welfare, on a dollarper-dollar basis, than Program D does. If the beneficiaries of Program C
are being asked to pay for it, and if they do not suffer from a lack of
information or from poor information processing, government should
not require them to pay more than their WTP.
As a general rule, the same conclusion applies to WTP over the lifespan. Government should not require younger people to "buy" more regulatory protection than they believe to be in their interests. Note here
that such protection is, in a sense, a form of compulsory insurance. If
younger people are not willing to pay much for such insurance, government ought not to compel them to do so unless there is some kind of
informational or cognitive problem with their decisions. Now it is entirely possible that some such problem is at work. Young people might be
acting as if low-probability events are worth no concern at all, or they
might be engaged in a form of hyperbolic discounting for risks that will
come to fruition in what seems to be the irrelevantly distant future.' 1 6
But unless a problem of this kind can be identified, WTP is the appropriate measure in cases in which regulation is a forced exchange.
D. When the Beneficiaries of Regulation Do Not Pay Its Full Cost, and
Regulation vs. Transfers
But it is frequently the case that the beneficiaries of regulatory protection pay little or none of its cost. 1 17 What should be done in that
116. See supra note 44.
117. This is true for Clean Air Act regulation. See, e.g., Matthew E. Kahn, The
Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, Regulation, Spring 2001, at 34, 37-38.
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event?1 18 Here the analysis is more complex. To see the problem, suppose that people who are under thirty would pay a median of $50 to eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, that the aggregate cost of eliminating that risk is
$55, but that the beneficiaries would pay only $10 of that amount, with
the remainder of the cost being borne by others (say, consumers and
employees). This program is, by hypothesis, inefficient, because the
monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits. But it might well bejustified on grounds of overall welfare; to answer that question, we would
need to measure the actual welfare effects of the program (to say the
least, a difficult task). In terms of the welfare of the beneficiaries of the
regulation, the question is much easier. If they are paying only $10 for
benefits valued at $50, they are net gainers (and perhaps they gain more
than the net losers lose). It follows that if social planners are particularly
interested in the welfare of the beneficiaries, the program might be
justified.
But there is an obvious response. To assist the relevant population, it
would be better to give them a cash subsidy than to provide them with a
regulatory benefit that is, by hypothesis, less valuable to them than it is
costly to those who must provide it. And under plausible assumptions, a
subsidy would indeed be better than a regulatory benefit, both because it
is more efficient and because it is a better means of accomplishing the
redistributive goal. In the face of background injustice, or indefensible
inequality, the tax system should usually be used as a corrective.' 1 9 On a
widely held view, regulation should involve maximization; redistributive
tax and spending policies, rather than regulation, should generally be
used to promote redistribution. 20 The claim is disputed. 121 But if redistribution is not going to come from tax and spending policies, it is certainly possible that provision of the regulatory benefit is preferable to the
status quo on grounds of both welfare and distribution. Note that a uni-

118. For an extremely valuable discussion in the related area of employment law, see
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 223-29 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 667 (1994)
("[R]edistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the
income tax and typically is less efficient."); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs.
Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 414, 414
(1981) (describing how income tax can compensate for inefficient liability rules and
redistribute income); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute
Income?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 439-40 (2003) ("[T]he tax system is a better tool for
redistribution of income than legal rules.").
120. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation 8 (1996); Weisbach, supra note 119, at 439-40.
121. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1069 (2001); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797, 820 (2000).
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form VSL or VSLY is itself a kind of redistributive strategy (imperfect to
22
be sure).1
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve the hardest questions here.
If the life-years approach ends up valuing younger people more than
older people (because they have more life-years left), the older people
have no claim to special government help. But we can reach some more
general conclusions about WTP and regulatory policy. If the beneficiaries of regulation pay its full cost and if there is no informational or
cognitive problem, WTP provides a reasonable place to start. If the beneficiaries of regulation do not pay its full cost, regulation might be justified
even if it exceeds WTP. For purposes of policy, one problem is that in
many cases, government cannot easily determine how much of the cost of
regulation is borne by its purported beneficiaries. With perfect tools, regulators would have a complete sense of the incidence of regulatory costs,
and an understanding of the distribution of benefits and burdens would
be helpful in making regulatory choices.' 23 But government lacks those
tools. The best approach is probably to begin with WTP to measure the
value of statistical life-years, and then to make distributional or other adjustments in appropriate cases. 12 4 Along these dimensions, the analysis
of statistical life-years does not differ from the analysis of statistical lives.
Of course government does not lack control over the distributional
incidence of efforts to protect safety, health, and the environment. Government might provide a regulatory benefit for free, perhaps by accompanying regulation with a cash payment to defray the costs faced by those
who are supposed to benefit. But an analysis of this possibility would take
me well beyond the present discussion.1 25 For reasons I have given, older
people, as such, are not a strong candidate for cash subsidies, even if
future studies find that their WTP is sometimes relatively low under a
VSLY approach.

122. See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in Cost-Benefit Analysis 7, 7-9 (Matthew D. Adler
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); see also Kahn, supra note 117, at 37-38. In the racial context,
a uniform VSL can even be seen as a form of affirmative action, in the sense that it gives a
"boost" to African American VSL because of a perception of past social discrimination.
Note that the boost also results in a reduction of white VSL, at least if regulators use the
median VSL. The problem is that if the beneficiaries of regulation are also paying for it,
then the boost might be hurting its intended beneficiaries if it is making them pay for
something that exceeds their informed WrP.
123. Note that in its recent draft guidelines, OMB asks regulators to try to assess the
distributional effects of regulation. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft 2003 Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5517 (Feb.
3, 2003).
124. See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note 29, at 292-93.
125. For some remarks on the possibility of such subsidies, see Sunstein, Arithmetic of
Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2299.
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E. Uniformity and Disaggregation in Monetay Valuation
Government agencies tend to use a uniform VSL. Proposals for the
use of VSLY tend to use a uniform number or a number that makes only
simple, crude distinctions-between, say, people under and over sixtyfive. 12 6 But we can make some conceptual progress here, and eventually
practical progress as well, if we recognize that if government had perfect
information, and if it could individuate regulatory benefits, its valuations
would be much more fine-grained. In fact the use of VSLY, as opposed to
VSL, can be seen as an initial step toward more in the way of individuation. To put the point in the simplest terms: To the extent that the beneficiaries of regulation bear its full costs and have perfect information, a perfectly
informed government might use a perfectly individuated WTP, giving people precisely the level ofprotection that they deem to be in their interests with respect to the
risk in question.1 27 If the result is to ensure that poor people are not given
adequate protection, subsidies, direct or in-kind, would be provided.
It follows that a uniform VSL, or a uniform VSLY, is not easy to justify. It can be supported partly on the ground that government lacks the
tools to bring about sufficient individuation across either people or risks.
We have seen that government does not know how VSLY varies across the
life cycle. With their various endowments and preferences, individuals
show a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to statistical hazards. We
have seen that wealthy people will pay more than poor people; risk-averse
people will of course pay more than risk-inclined people. In addition,
social risks, even risks of death, are hardly all the same. Many people are
risk-averse with respect to some hazards but risk-inclined with respect to
others. In deciding whether to be risk-averse, numerous distinctions
might be deemed relevant. People might reasonably distinguish, for example, between a risk of death from cancer and a risk of death from
heart disease; they might also distinguish among workplace risks, risks of
motor vehicle accidents, and risks associated with air pollution.1 28 If government were omniscient, it would individuate regulatory programs
along all these dimensions. And if regulatory tools could be perfectly
individuated, government might provide every individual with regulatory
protection that perfectly matched his preferences and hence his situation-specific WTP-assuming, again, that people are being forced to pay
the cost of that protection. 29 There would be no single VSL or VSLY;
the relevant values would be highly particular to persons and situations.

126. See supra note 18.
127. I am assuming that WTP is based on informed preferences and that there are no
third party effects.
128. For relevant discussion, see The Perception of Risk (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
129. As noted, subsidies might be appropriate in cases in which people's WTfP is low
because of (say) poverty despite the possibility of large gains from regulation.
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Why, then, does government rely on such crude population-wide,
largely risk-invarian 1 °1 measures? One reason is that it lacks good information about the WTP of subgroups;1 31 another reason is that many regulatory programs must simultaneously protect large populations, and
hence individuation is impractical. A decision to adopt subgroup-specific
WTP would be hard to defend unless the program in question would benefit and burden mostly or entirely classes of people who could be defined
in terms of those subgroup characteristics. As knowledge grows, it might
be expected that less uniform numbers will be used in the future. I cannot discuss that issue in any detail here, but the shift from VSL to VSLY
can be seen as a small but unmistakable movement in that direction.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

I have suggested that on grounds of welfare and equity, it makes a
great deal of sense to focus on statistical life-years rather than statistical
lives. At a minimum, regulators should have, and give, a sense of the lifeyears expected to be saved by regulation. An analysis of the savings, in
terms of statistical life-years, should be part of the agency's account of
expected benefits. The hard question involves the translation of life-years
into monetary equivalents. The basic claim for WTP is that it provides a
(crude but administrable) proxy for the welfare effects of various courses
of action. Other things being equal, more life-years provide more welfare
than fewer, whatever the results of WTP studies. But if young people
show a low VSLY, and if old people show a high one, government does
people no favors by using a uniform number if they are well informed
and if they bear the cost of the benefits that are being provided. Because
VSLY might vary over the lifespan, there is a risk that a uniform VSLY will
produce significant errors-possibly, in fact, more serious errors than a
uniform VSL.1 3 2 Ideally, a government that uses WTP, and seeks accuracy, would inquire into WTP over lifespans and use varying VSLY depending on the ages of the beneficiaries of regulation. Lacking that information, government might do best to proceed more modestly and
cautiously.
We could imagine a range of possibilities. At a minimum, a focus on
life-years allows alternatives to be ranked in terms of cost-effectiveness: A
130. But consider the sensitivity analysis in the context of arsenic: The EPA's findings
supported giving a premium because of the dread and involuntary nature of the cancer.
See Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2285.
131. For some developments here, see John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating
Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 257 (2003); Viscusi, Racial Differences, supra note 3.
132. The reason is that if a uniform VSLY leads to far too low numbers for some
people, and far too high numbers for others, the multiplication of life-years by the
monetary value might produce less accuracy than would reliance on a simple, single VSL.
Suppose, for example, that the government is choosing between a VSL of $6.1 million and
a VSLY of $200,000. If young people show a VSLY of $60,000, and if old people show a
VSLY of $350,000, it is possible that VSL will actually provide a better match to actual WTP.
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program that saves ten thousand life-years is better than one that saves
four thousand, and more resources should be devoted to the former than
to the latter. With respect to CBA, the most modest approach would be
purely informational: to calculate both VSL and VSLY (using the most
accurate available measure) and to inform the public of the calculations.
A mildly less modest approach would be to continue with VSL, but in
close cases to treat VSLY, or the age distribution of the protected population, as a kind of tie-breaker. When CBA produces difficult calls, agencies
might be told not to act if the benefited class is mostly elderly, but to do
so if the benefited class is mostly young. On this view, the age distribution would be consulted only if the case were otherwise in equipoise.
The most ambitious approach would be to abandon VSL and to use
VSLY instead, at least when and if reasonably accurate numbers are available.13 3 On this view, VSL would be seen as a crude first step toward the
more refined inquiry than VSLY makes possible. A number of intermediate approaches are imaginable. Perhaps VSL would be the basic foundation for analysis, but a sensitivity analysis (a separate analysis that shows
the effect of a new variable) would run the numbers with VSLY. Perhaps
regulators would have the authority, subject to political constraints, to use
one or another number when the circumstances make that decision seem
reasonable.1 3 4 Of course any effort to engage in analysis of costs and
benefits would be constrained in the usual fashion, with, for example,
permission to consider distributional considerations, especially if poor
35
people stand to lose or to gain a great deal from regulation.
133. In theory, it is possible that people show about the same WrP for the "remainder
of their life," one that does not vary greatly over the lifespan. If so, a uniform VSL would
be defensible. But the theoretical possibility is unlikely to be proved empirically.
134. One implication of the present discussion involves the possibility of legal
challenges to the decision to use either VSL or VSLY, and also to particular decisions about
how to measure them. Under some statutes, cost-benefit analysis is the basis for decision,
and in such cases, the agency's calculations are subject to challenge. See, e.g., Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991) (questioning EPA's
methodology in devising asbestos rule). In light of the present state of uncertainty, it
would not be arbitrary for an agency to choose either VSL or VSLY, though there are
plausible challenges to both measures. See Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3,
at 2290-93 ("[C]reative lawyers ... might be able to mount plausible challenges to the
EPA's decisions regardless (almost) of the content of those decisions.").
135. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489,
1525-27 (2002) (proposing exception to outcome of cost-benefit analysis where there are
compelling distributional concerns). Note that OMB suggests attention to distributional
considerations in its 2003 guidelines:
Your regulatory analysis should provide a separate description of distributional
effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are distributed among sub-populations of
particular concern) so that decision makers can properly consider them along
with the effects on economic efficiency. Executive Order 12866 authorizes this
approach. Where distributive effects are thought to be important, the effects of
various regulatory alternatives should be described quantitatively to the extent
possible, including the magnitude, likelihood, and severity of impacts on
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EXTENSIONS

The discussion thus far has been narrowly focused on the choice between statistical lives and statistical life-years. But an exploration of the
relevant issues has some broader implications. I explore three questions
here: the use of surveys to resolve hard normative questions; the choice
between QALYs and WTP in regulatory policy; and the possible opposition between welfare and WTP.
A. A Tempting Wrong Question
It might be tempting to argue that the choice between statistical lives
and VSL or statistical life-years and VSLY should be made not by asking
people about their WTP, but by asking them their preferences as between
programs that focus on VSL or VSLY. 13 6 People might be asked if they
believe that government should treat each averted fatality as no more and
no less than one, or if government should instead consider the age of
those whose lives are saved. If it emerges that people prefer life-years,
then we might select appropriate numbers by asking subjects to choose
between programs with different amounts for VSLY, or by seeing,
through surveys, how people value life-years over the course of a lifespan.
It might turn out, for example, that people consider each life-year as
equivalent to (say) $200,000; or perhaps people will value life-years at a
special premium when the beneficiaries are either especially old or especially young. Perhaps people do not believe that every life-year counts as
equivalent to every other, but would prefer to devote special attention to
the life-years of those at identifiable points on the age distribution. In
any case, the suggestion would be that policy should be set by consulting
not WTP, but instead the public's judgments about the appropriate
values.
This solution has some intuitive appeal; it seems responsive, as a democracy should be, to citizens' judgments. Hence this solution has been
137
If
used as a way of getting some purchase on the normative issues.
WTP in the market seems to have distortions, surveys of citizens might
seem better, perhaps because they invite people to consult their conscience, not simply their self-interest. But this approach has two fundamental problems. The first is that people's answers are highly likely to
depend on how the questions are set up. The second is that even if people do have stable answers to such questions, it is unclear that those answers have any moral standing for purposes of policy and law. These
particular groups. You should be alert for situations in which regulatory
alternatives result in significant changes in treatment or outcomes for different
groups.
Circular A-4, supra note 14, at 14.
136. For a related survey, see McKie et al., supra note 21, at 117-26.
137. See id. at 127-28.
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problems suggest that surveys are not likely to be a helpful way to solve
138
many normative issues of this kind.
1. An Analogy. - Consider the analogous question of obligations to
40
future generations, t 39 a much-disputed problem in regulatory policy.'
A regulatory system that attempts to track people's preferences would try
to measure intergenerational time preferences, that is, people's judgments
about how to trade off the protection of current lives and future lives.
Hence an important question, asked in many debates about the issue, is
whether people actually make such judgments and whether they can be
elicited. And indeed, an influential set of studies finds that people value
the lives of those in the current generation far more than the lives of
those in future generations.1 4' From a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors suggest that people are indifferent between saving
one life today and saving forty-five lives in one hundred years.' 42 They
make this suggestion on the basis of questions asking people whether
they would choose a program that saves "100 lives now" or a program that
'143
saves a substantially larger number "100 years from now.
But it turns out that other descriptions of the same problem yield
significantly different results.1 44 Here, as in other contexts, it is unclear
whether people actually have well-formed preferences with which the legal system can work. 145 For example, most people consider "equally bad"
a single death from pollution next year and a single death from pollution
in one hundred years 146 -implying no preference for members of the
current generation. In another study finding no strong preference for
the current generation, those surveyed were equally divided between two
programs: one that will save fifty-five lives now and 105 more lives in
138. For a general discussion of moral framing, overlapping with that here, see
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 63.
139. See Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future
Lives Valued Less?, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 39, 39-40 (2003).
140. Circular A-4, supra note 14, at 31-37 (discussing complexities and suggesting
discount rates of three percent and seven percent); Revesz, supra note 3, at 947
(characterizing debate as "shrill and unproductive" and suggesting that harms to future
generations should be treated differently from latent harms); Edward R. Morrison,
Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1333, 1337-60 (1998) (exploring "ethical, political, and economic
dimensions" of discounting debate).
141. See Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the
Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 243, 243-45, 257-59 (1994)
[hereinafter Cropper, Preferences for Life Saving] (final study); Maureen L. Cropper et
al., Rates of Time Preference for Saving Lives, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 469,
469-72 (1992) (preliminary study).
142. Cropper, Preferences for Life Saving, supra note 141, at 244, 254.
143. Id. at 245-46.
144. Frederick, supra note 139, at 40.
145. The point is stressed in Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
146. Frederick, supra note 139, at 43.
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twenty years, and one that will save one hundred lives now and fifty lives
twenty-five years from now. 14 7 It is even possible to frame the question in
such a way as to find that future lives are valued more, not less, highly
than current lives. 148 The most sensible conclusion is that people do not
have robust, well-ordered intergenerational time preferences.149 If so, it
is not possible for government to track those preferences, because they
are an artifact of how the question is put.
The issue of statistical lives or VSL vs. statistical life-years or VSLY is
similar on this count. It should be easy to construct questions that would
yield a preference for VSL:
Government is consideringa policy that would count the value of elderly
people as significantly less than the value of younger people. According
to one proposal,for every dollar that most people are worth, people over
seventy are worth fifty-three cents. Do you approve of this proposal?
We can safely predict that most respondents would answer "No." But it
should also be easy to construct questions that would suggest public disapproval of a uniform VSL:
Would you favor (a) a program that would save one hundred children
from dying of a fatal cancer at the age of ten or instead (b) a program
that would save one hundred and one senior citizens from dying of a
fatal cancer at the age of eighty?
We can safely predict that most people would favor (a). In fact I have
conducted a small survey myself, asking University of Chicago law students whether they would favor a policy that saves twenty people with a
median age of forty or one that saves thirty people with a median age of
sixty-five. By a majority of about two-to-one (fifty-three to twenty-five), the
former policy was favored. But as in the context of harms to future generations, highly variable responses should be expected in accordance with
the nature of the question. It is doubtful that people have stable, wellconsidered judgments on the issue.
2. Why the Question Is Wrong. - The more fundamental problem is
that people's judgments on survey questions of this sort should not be
determinative for purposes of policy or law. Suppose, for example, that a
relevant population concluded that it would rather save one hundred
white lives than one hundred African American lives-or that it would
prefer to abandon cost-benefit analysis altogether, finding both VSL and
147. Id. at 44.
148. Id. at 45. Frederick asked subjects to choose between two programs. The first
would become more effective over time, saving one hundred lives this decade, two
hundred lives in the following decade, and three hundred lives in the decade after that.
The second would become less effective over time, saving three hundred lives this decade,
two hundred lives in the following decade, and one hundred lives in the decade after that.
Most people preferred the first program, apparently suggesting that future lives are valued
more highly. Id.
149. The absence of robust, well-ordered preferences is a pervasive theme in
behavioral economics. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 145 (manuscript at 9-12). On
moral framing in general, see Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 63.
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VSLY morally unacceptable. What kind of standing would those judgments have? Or suppose that existing generations concluded that a current life is worth fifty lives in 2080. Why should that conclusion count for
purposes of policy? What matters is not the fact of those judgments, but
their legitimacy and their sense. Compare the effort to answer the ageold question whether baseball is really seventy-five percent pitching. One
analyst, writing in the 1980 Baseball ResearchJournal, attempted to answer
this question by "asking everybody in sight what percentage of baseball
was pitching, totaling up their answers, and dividing by the number of
people in sight. ' 15 0 Many economic surveys attempt to answer hard questions by following the same (ludicrous) method. If we care about WTP, it
is only because WTP is a proxy for welfare, and because welfare deserves
(some) moral standing as such. But eliciting people's judgments on future generations or VSL vs. VSLY has no such justification.
To be sure, those judgments deserve consideration and respect if
they are reflective. And it is always possible to ask: Who will assess the
legitimacy and sense of citizens' judgments? This is a reasonable question, and it is certainly possible to doubt the legitimacy and sense of the
assessor. But ours is a deliberative democracy, one that should not make
policy on the basis of opinion polls.' 51 Difficult normative questions of
this kind might be informed by surveys, but they cannot be answered by
them.
B. A Brief Note on QALYs
If focusing on life-years is appropriate, then it might be tempting to
suggest that officials should be concerned with quality-adjusted life-years,
or QALYs. The central idea behind QALYs is that regulators should be
15 2
concerned with maximizing the aggregate health of the community.
To calculate QALYs, regulators come up with a scale that ranges from
zero, for death, to one, for perfect health. Adverse health effects are
ranked in terms of severity, with serious harms (say, a devastating but
nonfatal heart attack) ranked lower than less serious ones (say, low-level
respiratory problems). Some government agencies have attempted to assess regulations by calculating the QALYs that they save. 1 53 From the
public health perspective, it is easy to see the appeal of QALYs. If a
150. Michael Lewis, Moneyball 81 (2003).
151. See Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason 212-17 (1994)
([R]epresentatives ...may better promote the public good than the immediate and direct
voice of the people.").
152. See Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J. Health
Econ. 21, 22 (1991).
153. See infra Appendix. On the possibility of converting QALYs into WTP, see
Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a
Standard, 20 Med. Decision Making 332 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: CostBenefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety 56 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr., Working
Paper No. 03-12, Nov. 2003), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/pdfFiles/php
IM.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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choice must be made, a doctor might reasonably decide, for example,
that she will perform a difficult operation on someone who is thirty
rather than someone who is eighty. And if the public health community
has to allocate scarce resources, an inquiry into QALYs seems like a sensible place to start.
If government should calculate VSLY, should it also calculate the
value of QALYs, understood as VQALYs, and proceed accordingly? I cannot answer that complex question here. But we can see that any response
must come to terms with questions of both welfare and equity. At first
glance, an effort to increase the number of QALYs has many advantages
in terms of welfare; in fact it seems directly connected to the welfare goal.
But the conversion of QALYs into dollar equivalents raises many complexities, and in some contexts, the use of QALYs would raise serious questions of equity. Suppose, for example, that regulators are considering
two kinds of interventions, Intervention A and Intervention B, designed
to assist two different groups of people. The first group consists of people with extremely serious disabilities; Intervention A would increase
their QALYs. But it would do so only by creating a relatively small increase in their well-being, raising them from extremely serious to merely
serious levels of disability. The second group consists of people with
moderate levels of disability, and Intervention B would raise them to
slight levels of disability, in a way that would result in significantly more
QALYs than Intervention A. If QALYs are our guide, Intervention B is
clearly preferable, and indeed it is plausible to think that Intervention B
would result in a larger welfare gain than Intervention A.
Is Intervention B to be preferred? This is by no means obvious, and
for two different reasons. First, QALYs might not be adequately measuring welfare gains in this context. In the abstract, it is possible that the
welfare gains from Intervention A are actually higher even if it produces
fewer increases in QALYs. Perhaps this is simply a measurement issue.
But second and more fundamentally, Intervention A is assisting those
who are most severely disadvantaged, and people in that category have a
claim on social attention even if helping them produces fewer QALYs
than imaginable alternatives. 54 Those with especially severe pre-existing
conditions might deserve higher priority on equitable grounds, whatever
the QALY calculus might show. Here as elsewhere, the pursuit of welfare,
through regulation, should be undertaken in a way that gives distributional weights to those who are least well-off. In this way, the larger philosophical debates about utilitarianism and its limits find analogies in current and coming debates about regulatory policy.
I do not mean to suggest that these are fundamental objections to
the use of QALYs. The problem of severe pre-existing conditions does
not often arise in the context of regulation; it is more likely to occur in
154. See Erik Nord et al., Incorporating Societal Concerns for Fairness in Numerical
Valuations of Health Programmes, 8 Health Econ. 25, 26-27 (1999).
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the context of medical interventions, where QALYs have raised special
concerns. As I have suggested, there are also hard questions about how
to monetize QALYs, 1 55 even if we decide that we should focus on them.
Is the WTP approach appropriate here? Should VQALYs be calculated by
multiplying each QALY by the beneficiaries' WTP for them? We could
easily imagine a population (one of wealthy senior citizens, for example)
that would show a high WTP for a few QALYs. We could also imagine a
population (one of poor teenagers, for example) that would show a low
WTP for a large number of QALYs. At first glance, QALYs are a far better
measure of welfare gains than WTP in such situations.
But recall once again the particular problems created by forced exchanges: If those who obtain a large number of QALYs are not willing to
pay for them, government does them no favors by mandating the
purchase. In a case in which people are not willing to pay much for a
large number of QALYs, government should probably do a great deal of
subsidizing. My analysis of the uses of WTP in the context of statistical
lives applies, in its essential form, to the context of QALYs-suggesting
that here as elsewhere, WTP is a sensible place to begin, but that there
are extremely difficult and unresolved normative and empirical questions
here.
C. Welfare vs. WTP
I have suggested that WTP is a plausible starting place for policy
judgments about how to monetize statistical life-years. But I have also
indicated that in the face of a problem of information or cognition, the
argument for relying on WTP is greatly weakened. It will be useful to
explore that possibility.
The most obvious cases are simple: People lack information about
the risks that they face, and hence they show a small WTP to avoid a risk
that is statistically large. Or people might have an inflated sense of the
likely risk and show a high WTP to avoid a risk that is miniscule.1 5 6 (Here
there are independent questions about whether and how to monetize
public fear. 1 57 ) A growing body of literature shows a separate point: At
the time of decision, people often mispredict the welfare effects of one or
another option. 15 8 For example, assistant professors often exaggerate the
effects of a denial of tenure on their well-being a year after the decision. 159 In general, people overestimate the adverse consequences of set155. See Hirth et al., supra note 153; Adler, supra note 153.
156. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112
Yale L.J. 61 (2002) (arguing that probability of harm is frequently neglected when people's
emotions are activated).
157. For an excellent discussion, see Adler, supra note 153.
158. See Kahneman, Psychological Perspective, supra note 31, at 163; Loewenstein &
Schkade, supra note 32, at 86.
159. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617, 622-24 (1998).
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backs, to which they are frequently able to adapt. 160 In the context of
environmental and social changes, an empirical study shows pervasive exaggerations of likely consequences for quality of life. 161 It follows that in
some contexts, WTP will mispredict the lived consequences of choices.
"The evidence of grave deficiencies in taste predictions appears to pose a
significant challenge to many applications of the rational-agent
model. 1 6 2 Some of these deficiencies stem from a failure to appreciate
the possibility of adaptation to change; some of them are a product of an
163
exaggerated sense of the effect of any single factor on well-being.
What I am adding here is that WTP will be a poor proxy for welfare in
164
cases in which we have good reason to suppose that underestimation
or overestimation is likely. Of course government officials should be reluctant to second-guess citizens, but in some cases, the second-guessing is
65
well justified. 1
Consider an example: Reliable contingent valuation studies show
that people are willing to pay far more to prevent a long cancer death
than to prevent a sudden unanticipated death, with death from heart disease falling somewhere in the middle. 166 As it happens, the median WTP
for a sudden unanticipated death is half the median WTP for a cancer
death. 1 67 Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of policy, assuming that the contingent valuation study is reliable? 1 68 I suggest that they
should not be ifwe have reason to believe that the WTP figures are not
accurately measuring welfare. And is it even plausible to think that the
"cancer premium" is so high that it actually doubles the cost of death? Is
it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually twice as bad as a
death that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure, a degree of pain and
suffering typically accompanies cancer, but it is not easy to defend the set
160. See Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 32, at 89-90.
161. See George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to
Environmental Change, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior 52, 61-67 (Max Bazerman
et al. eds., 1997).
162. Kahneman, Psychological Perspective, supra note 31, at 165.
163. See Loewenstein & Frederick, supra note 161, at 66. On wanting the wrong
things, see Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting, in Feeling and Thinking:
The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Timothy D. Wilson
& Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol., June
2003, at 345.
164. For suggestive evidence of underestimation of risk in the context of marriage
(the relevant risk is that of divorce), see Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial
Agreements? (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion
Paper No. 436, Sept. 2003), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/
papers/pdf/436.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review), finding that an overwhelming
majority of people believe that they are not likely to get divorced, despite a divorce rate of
about 50%, and despite widespread knowledge of that divorce rate.
165. For related discussion, see Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 145 (manuscript at 42).
166. See George Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in Valuing Health for
Policy: An Economic Approach 323, 342 tbl.15.5 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994).
167. Id.
168. For an affirmative answer, see Revesz, supra note 3, at 941.
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of (exotic) values that would lead to the conclusion that the relevant pain
and suffering is as bad as death itself. 1 69 I believe that WTP is not measuring welfare here, and that the inflated numbers for cancer deaths are
a product of an intuitive recoil at the idea of cancer, one that leads to
unrealistically high monetary values.
Perhaps this example can be disputed. If so, consider the fact that
according to some studies of WTP, a curable cancer is valued at $3.6 million, more than one-third the value of a statistical life. 170 Suppose that
these studies are reliable and that $3.6 million really does capture people's WTP for a curable cancer. 17 1 Is it plausible to think that the welfare
loss from a curable cancer is more than one-third of the welfare loss from
a cancer death? (Ask someone who has been cured of cancer.) More
likely, the frightening idea of "cancer" is driving people's judgments, in a
way that leads to a WTP that does not accurately measure the welfare loss
from a curable cancer. This is an example of a situation in which "decision utility" (anticipated utility at the time of decision) does not match
"experience utility" (the actual utility of lived experience) .172 There are
many other illustrations, as, for example, when people show a high WTP
173
to avoid an injury that is not so terrible in actual experience.
In short, WTP is sometimes a poor proxy for welfare. Because that
issue does not directly bear on the choice between VSL and VSLY, I will
not discuss it in detail here. But I do suggest that the point holds out a
warning for the use of WTP studies to assess statistical risks, especially in
the domain of morbidity.
CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have argued that as part of its analysis of the expected
benefits of regulation, government should focus its attention on statistical
life-years, not statistical lives. No regulatory program makes people immortal. The only issue is life extension, and here the length of the exten169. If one believed that death itself is not terribly important, and that pain and
suffering matter a great deal, then a huge cancer premium might well make sense. And
undoubtedly some people have this set of values. All I am suggesting is that the people
who give the relevant answers in contingent valuation studies are most unlikely to endorse
those particular values.
170. See Sunstein, Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note 3, at 2286.
171. Note that WTP is often labile and ill formed, very much dependent on the
context of the question. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 145 (manuscript at 15-21). I
am putting that possibility to one side for now. The general claim here is that even when
WTP is stable and well formed, it might not capture the welfare that comes from one or
another option. For relevant discussion, see Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham, supra
note 31.
172. See Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham, supra note 31.
173. See EdwardJ. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain
and Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341, 1354-73 (1995) (finding that willingness to pay
is systematically lower than willingness to accept for pain and suffering). The most
important point here is that the experience of an injury is often less bad, because more
adaptation is possible than people anticipate in advance. See id. at 1373.
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sion surely matters. In terms of welfare, a program that saves ten thousand life-years is better than one that saves one thousand life-years,
holding all else constant. Behind a veil of ignorance, reasonable people
would undoubtedly prefer a program that eliminates a 1/500,000 risk
faced at thirty to a program that eliminates the same risk faced at sixty.
In welfare terms, a program that saves younger people is unquestionably
better than one that saves older people, holding all else constant. As part
of their qualitative account of what regulation will do, agencies should
describe the expected savings in terms of statistical life-years.
To be sure, there are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare
through regulatory policy. Regulation should not be seen as a kind of
maximization machine, indifferent to distributional issues or to limitations rooted injustice. But as a general rule, there is no injustice in taking account of the difference between the anticipated welfare gain of a
program that saves older people and the anticipated welfare gain of a
program that saves younger people. Older people were once younger,
and if all goes well younger people will become older. In any case a focus
on statistical life-years has an important kind of neutrality: It treats everyone's life-years the same. I have also suggested that the claims that underlie the prohibition on age discrimination do not raise serious moral questions about focusing on life-years. These points suggest that in terms of
welfare and equity, it is better to attend to statistical life-years than to
statistical lives.
But a choice in favor of life-years leaves open questions of monetary
valuation-of how to convert regulatory benefits into monetary
equivalents. These questions are both normative and empirical in nature. The usual debates about WTP reappear in this context, and I do
not attempt to resolve those debates here. Instead I have emphasized a
serious problem for those who are committed to WTP: We do not have
good information about how WTP changes over the life cycle. Older people may or may not be willing to pay less to reduce risks than younger
people. Even if older people are willing to pay more to save each remaining statistical life-year, my hunch is that studies will eventually find that
older people are willing to pay less than younger people, in the aggregate, to save the number of life-years that remain. 1 74 Without taking a
stand on the WTP debate, I have suggested several ways that regulators
might incorporate information about life-years into regulatory decisions.
At a minimum, I have urged that information on life-years should be
compiled and that it should be made relevant to judgments that are otherwise close or difficult. In this way, regulatory policy would be shifted
toward somewhat greater concern for the risks faced by children, and
somewhat reduced concern for the risks faced by those who are elderlythus making it more likely that more people would have a chance to become elderly.
174. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 83, at 50-53.
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If the analysis here is correct, it has two more general implications.
The first is that WTP is a pragmatic tool and no more. Some economists
seem to identify WTP with welfare itself-an absurd claim that, if taken
seriously, would produce both blunders and injustices. As we have seen,
people's WTP is sometimes poorly predictive of the welfare effects of one
or another option 1 7 5 -a point with general and underexplored implications for regulatory policy. The second involves constraints on the promotion of welfare. While welfare is indeed the basic goal of much regulation, there are constraints on the pursuit of that goal, and these
constraints should be specified. Any attempt at specification will be controversial. I have contended, for example, that when people have had
bad luck in the natural lottery, government cannot legitimately use the
life-years criterion to disadvantage them further. But however the hardest controversies are resolved, I suggest that the constraints do not apply
to most regulatory decisions that focus on statistical life-years. Regulators
should calculate expected savings in those terms and give the result serious consideration at the point of decision.

175. For a great deal of relevant discussion, see Kahneman et al., Well-Being, supra
note 32.
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REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENTS USING LIFE-YEARS
176
OR QUALITY-ADJUSTED LIFE-YEARS

FDA Final Seafood HACCP Rule (1995): Procedures for the Safe and
Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 21 C.F.R.
pts. 123, 1240 (1995). Using monetized QALYs in benefit-cost analysis.
FDA FinalAnti-Smoking Rule (1996): Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820,
897 (1996). Using QALYs in a benefit-cost analysis.
EPA Final Ozone and Particulate Standards for Outdoor Air Quality
(1997): National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2003). Using life-years but not QALYs in a
sensitivity analysis of benefit-cost analysis.
FDA Final Mammography Rule (1997): Quality Mammography Standards, 21 C.F.R. pt. 16 at 900 (1997). Using a 5-year survival rate approach when measuring benefits, but monetized only lives saved, using
the value of a statistical life of $5 million.
HRSA Organ Donor FinalRule (1998): Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 112 (1998). Using statistical
life-years valued at $116,000 per year.
FDA FinalJuice Labeling Rule (1998): Food Labeling: Warning and
Notice Statement , Labeling of Juice Products, 21 C.F.R. pt. 101 (1998).
Using monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis.
FDA Proposed Consumer Trans-FatLabeling Rule (1999): Food Labeling:
Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and
Health Claims, 64 Fed. Reg. 62,746, 62,772 (Nov. 17, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). Using monetized QALYs in a benefit-cost
analysis.
FDA Final Shell Egg Safety Rule (2000): Food Labeling, Safe Handling
Statements, Labeling of Shell Eggs; Refrigeration of Shell Eggs Held for
Retail Distribution, 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 101, 115 (2000). Using monetized
QALYs in a benefit-cost analysis.
FDA FinalJuice HACCP Rule (2001): Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing
and Importing of Juice, 21 C.F.R. pt. 120 (2001). Using monetized
QALYs in a benefit-cost analysis.
CMS Immunization Standards Final Rule with Comment (2002): Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions of Participation: Immunization
Standards for Hospitals, Long-Term Care Facilities, and Home Health
Agencies, 42 C.F.R. pts. 482-484 (2002). Using $50,000-$100,000 cost
per year of healthy life saved to monetize benefits, assuming lifespan of
84 years.
176. I am grateful to John Morrall of the Office of Management and Budget for
providing the information on which this appendix is based.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

Thomas B. Nachbar 272
This Article examines a question of general interpretive significance about the relationshipbetween enumeratedpowers within the particular context of intellectual property. Specifically, the Article asks
whether Congress can avoid the restrictionson its intellectualproperty
power (such as the "limited Times" requirement or the prohibition
against protecting facts and, consequently, electronic databases) by
resorting instead to other Article I powers, most notably the commerce
power.
Because the federal government is one of enumerated powers, it is
impossible as a matter of text or structureto determine whether limits on
one Article I power apply to the others. Instead, one must identify the
values underlying the different Section 8 restrictions and whether they
are worthy of general application-whether they represent constitutional norms.
Once one closely examines the history of intellectualproperty and
American trade regulation, it becomes clear that no such generally applicable norm is at work in the limits on Congress's intellectualproperty
power. Beliefs about the importance of preventing Congressfrom granting monopolies were neither widely held at the time of the framing nor
were they a feature of the Constitution as adopted. In the end, "exclusive rights" are merely anotherform of regulation that Congress may,
and frequently does, use to confer economic rents on favored special
interests. The Constitution, it will come as no surprise, offers very little
protection against rent-seeking.
CONSTITUTIONAL NoRMs

W. Bradley Wendel 363
Discussions of legal ethics generally assume that lawyers should
deliberate straightforwardly on the basis of reasons to act or refrain
from acting. This model of deliberationfails to accountfor the role of
the law in resolving normative disagreement and coordinatingsocial
activity by people who do not share comprehensive ethical doctrines.
The law represents a collective decision about what citizens ought to do,
which replaces the reasons individuals would otherwise have to act.
This Article contends that legal ethics ought to be understood as an
aspect of this theory of the authority of law. On this account, lawyers
have a duty not to reintroducecontested moral beliefs into the law by
relying on them as a justification for action within the lawyer-client

CIVIL OBEDIENCE
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relationship. Lawyers should not act on the basis of their principled
moral beliefs, but on the basis of legal directives. This does not mean
that lawyers should blindly defer to their clients' wishes, and it does not
entail the familiarmaxim of zealous advocacy within the bounds of the
law. In many cases, this conception of legal ethics is closer to the traditional vision of the lawyers as guardiansof the public purposes of the
law. In the course of developing this argument, this Article uses case
studies of lawyering dilemmas to illustrate how respect for the law
makes a difference to legal ethics.
NOTES
THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT EXCEPTION:
A CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE

Daniel Suleiman 426
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, on the heels of two United
States Supreme Court decisions and widespread academic support, a
major development in constitutionallaw was afoot: judicial review of
states' substantive criminal laws. But more than forty-five years after
Lambert v. California signaled its beginning, the movement to constitutionalizethe substantive criminal law has all but died. There has
been one significant exception, however, to the Court'sgeneral disinclination to regulate the substantive criminal law: capital punishment.
Since the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia
struck down nearly every death penalty statute in the United States, the
Court has heavily constitutionalized the substance and procedure of
capital punishment, based upon the idea that "death is different."
This Note argues that while death may differ qualitativelyfrom other
forms of punishment, it does not differ enough to justify separate theories ofjudicial reviewfor capital and noncapitalpunishment laws. It
concludes that, as the Court has found with the death penalty, in the
areas of mens rea and proportionality, the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments support setting constitutional limits on the substantive
criminal law.
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY:

PATCHWORK VERDICTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
Stacey
LOCATING A GUILTY AGENT

Neumann Vu 459
For a corporation to be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must
prove that one or more agents committed all the elements of the crime.
This is relatively easy to do f a crime has occurred in a small organization, but the structure of a large organization can make prosecution
difficult, particularly where mens rea is an element of the crime. Where
evidence of multiple guilty agents exists, the defense can exploit this
ambiguity to create reasonable doubt as to each agent. Such an outcome seems wrong-criminalconviction should be more, not less, likely
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where evidence of multiple guilty agents exists. This Note argues that
courts should inform the jury that they can reach a guilty verdict without agreement upon which agent engaged in the criminal offense. Such
an instruction is appropriateand desirable in thejury's initial charge.
ESSAY
THE ECONOMICS OF

FoRM

AND SUBSTANCE IN

Avery Wiener Katz 496
For over a century, legal commentators have debated the relative
merits of formal and substantive approaches to the interpretation of
contracts;in recentyears, the debate has increasingly been conducted in
the language of the economic approachto contract law. While this new
wave of scholarship has been relatively successful in relating the traditional debates over formalism to specific transactional and institutional problems such as imperfect information, it has been less productive in terms of generating useful legal or policy recommendations.
This Essay proposes a different approach: one thatfocuses on private
rather than public legal decisionmakers as its primary audience. In
general, private lawmakers are better able to make practical use of the
economic analysis of contracts, in part because the detailed information
that is necessary to implement such analysis intelligently is likelier to be
availableat the individual level. Furthermore,there are many opportunities for contractingparties to choose between relatively formal and
relatively substantive interpretive regimes. What is needed is a basic
taxonomy of economic considerations that can serve as an organizing
framework for parties choosing between form and substance when designing contracts. The later part of the Essay. sets out such a
framework.
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
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